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Le Monnier 
John H. Munro 
The ‘New Institutional Economics’ and the Changing Fortunes of Fairs  
in Medieval and Early Modern Europe:  
the Textile Trades, Warfare, and Transaction Costs 
Institutions in the ‘Birth of  Europe’: Long Distance Trade, Fairs, and Transaction Costs 
No institutions were more important than fairs in the early commerciali-
sation of  the European economy, following what Robert Lopez called ‘the 
Birth of  Europe’, from the late tenth and eleventh centuries. This was the 
very era, according to the well-known if  now unpopular Pirenne thesis, in 
which Europe experienced the revival of  long-distance trade and the conse-
quent growth of  towns, as the chief  motors of  economic growth.1 Lopez 
also viewed the ensuing three centuries as the ‘Commercial Revolution’ era, 
during which Europe acquired the veritable foundations of  modern capital-
ism in new commercial and financial institutions. Even those unsympathetic 
to the Pirenne or Lopez theses might still agree that international fairs based 
on long-distance trade did play a crucial role in European economic devel-
opment during these three centuries.2 
If  the study of  institutions, and in particular commercial institutions, has 
long been a commonplace feature old-fashioned forms of  European eco-
nomic history, the particular and often peculiar dynamics of  such institutions 
did not really receive their proper due in theoretical Economics until the re-
nowned economic historians Douglass North and Robert Fogel won the No-
                                                     
1 R. LOPEZ, The Birth of  Europe, New York 1966, pp. 108-45. See also ID., The Trade of  Medieval Europe: 
The South, in Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, ed. M.M. POSTAN, E.E. RICH, II, Trade and Industry in the 
Middle Ages, Cambridge 1952, pp. 257-354; reprinted with very few revisions in the 2nd edn. of  1987 (ed. 
M.M. POSTAN), pp. 401-479; H. PIRENNE, Mahomet et Charlemagne, Paris 1937; translated as: Mohammad and 
Charlemagne, London 1939; ID., Histoire économique de l'occident médiéval, ed. E. COORNAERT, Bruges 1951; R. 
LATOUCHE, The Birth of  the Western Economy: Economic Aspects of  the Dark Ages, London 1956. 
2 Such emphasis on commercial institutions does not imply, however, any neglect of  the more con-
temporary research that has been done on agrarian and demographic history; but neither time nor space 
permit an examination of  the obviously crucial linkages between agrarian, demographic, and commercial 
and related institutional factors and forces in European economic growth. 
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bel Prize for Economics in 1993.3 North’s particular contributions to the so-
called ‘new institutional economics’ are fundamentally based upon the roles 
that various institutions have played in reducing the burden of  transaction 
costs in European economic development, from medieval to modern times. 
In one of  the best articles to highlight this theme, Clyde Reed, a prominent 
student of  Douglass North, has demonstrated that a given reduction in trans-
action costs (of, say, 10 percent) had a far more powerful effect in stimulating 
economic growth, in early-modern Europe, than did a proportional reduction 
in production costs.4 
In the fully-developed North model, the concept of  ‘transaction costs’ 
includes all those directly, indirectly, and ultimately involved in transferring 
goods from producers to consumers. For North, the most important such 
costs were those incurred in seeking out and securing market information, 
and, in particular, ‘the costs of  specifying and enforcing the contracts that 
underlie all exchange’; but, also more broadly, all related costs involved in es-
tablishing and defending related property rights.5 Long before the seminal 
work of  Douglass North, however, Frederic Lane (1900-84) had established 
his early reputation, during World War II, with several publications devoted to 
this very same theme of  ‘protection costs’6. 
One of  North’s major analytical contributions was to point out that ‘the 
transactions sector, unlike the production of  industrial or agricultural goods 
[in the pre-modern economy], is subject to economies of  scale’, thus involv-
ing very large fixed costs for most components of  that sector. In other 
                                                     
3 See Two Pioneers of  Cliometrics: Robert W. Fogel and Douglass C. North, Nobel Laureates of  1993, ed. CLI-
OMETRIC SOCIETY, Oxford, Ohio 1994 (Miami University), with contributions by Stanley Engerman, John 
R.T. Hughes, Donald N. McCloskey, Richard C. Sutch, and Samuel H. Williamson. His co-winner, fur-
thermore, Robert Fogel, receiving his prize essentially for his work in promoting econometrics or ‘cliomet-
rics’, arguably formulated his major econometric contributions in terms of  institutions as well, those 
governing transportation networks and slavery in particular. 
4 C.G. REED, Transactions Costs and Differential Growth in Seventeenth Century Western Europe, in “Journal 
of  Economic History”, 33, March 1973, pp. 177-190, especially pp. 180-186. 
5 D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge 1973, pp. 
71-96, 134-138 (quotation on p. 93); D. NORTH, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York 1981, 
chapters 1-5; ID., Government and the Cost of  Exchange in History, in “Journal of  Economic History”, 44, 1984, 
pp. 255-264; ID., Transaction Costs in History, in “Journal of  European Economic History”, 14, 1985, pp. 
557-576. 
6 F. LANE, National Wealth and Protection Costs, in War as a Social Institution: the Historian’s Perspective, ed. J. 
CLARKSON, TH.C. COCHRAN, New York 1941, pp. 32-43, subsequently revised as the following: F.C. 
LANE, The Economic Meaning of  War and Protection, in “Journal of  Social Philosophy and Jurisprudence”, 7, 
1942, pp. 254-270; ID., Force and Enterprise in the Creation of  Oceanic Commerce, in “Journal of  Economic His-
tory”, 10, 1950, pp. 19-31, published as the supplement The Task of  Economic History; and ID., Economic 
Consequences of  Organized Violence, in “Journal of  Economic History”, 18, 1959, pp. 401-417. All have been 
republished in his Venice and History: the Collected Papers of  Frederic C. Lane, Baltimore 1966, pp. 373-428. 
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words, if  trade and related commercial-financial transactions were organized 
on such a large scale that the normally high fixed costs could be spread over a 
large volume of  commercial-financial transactions, especially if  they could be 
concentrated rather than diffused, the unit transaction costs would necessarily 
fall. Conversely, if  such commercial-financial transactions were disrupted, 
diminished, circumscribed, and reduced in scale or diffused, the unit transac-
tion cost would adversely rise. Once more another eminent medieval eco-
nomic historian, Michael Postan, had suggested something rather similar in 
contending that the ‘proportion of  trading costs to total costs was probably 
less in the Middle Ages than it is now’, but also that they subsequently rose as 
‘local taxation, war and piracy became more disturbing and more difficult to 
circumvent as the Middle Ages drew to their close’.7 
The emphasis that Douglass North’s model of  the ‘transaction sector’ has 
placed on securing and defending market information and privileges (includ-
ing privileged or asymmetric information), contracts, and property rights does 
not, however, seem to leave much room for the more mundane elements of  
distribution, marketing, and transportation costs.8 Yet surely these are also 
equally legitimate and important aspects of  his concept of  the all-embracing 
costs involved in transferring goods from producers to consumers, necessar-
ily via the commercial-financial sector. Thus whether or not Douglass North 
and his disciples would fully approve of  their inclusion, this current study will 
necessarily do so, much as Michael Postan certainly did.  
 
Peace, Warfare, Transportation: and the Van der Wee Model on Long-Distance Trade 
Furthermore the central theme of  this study focuses as well upon 
Postan’s observations on the role of  warfare in the later-medieval economy: 
in particular, the impact of  related fiscal, monetary and commercial policies, 
of  brigandage and piracy, and of  various defensive responses, in raising 
                                                     
7 M. POSTAN, The Trade of  Medieval Europe: the North, in The Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, ed. 
M.M. POSTAN, E. MILLER, II, Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, 2nd edn., Cambridge 1987, p. 204 [The 
chapter in the first edn. of  1952 has been reprinted in: M.M. POSTAN, Medieval Trade and Finance, Cam-
bridge 1973, pp. 92-231.] But for more modern times, the rest of  Postan’s quotation would differ markedly 
from that of  Clyde Reed in stating that: ‘[this] is merely another way of  saying that far greater economies 
have resulted from industrial revolutions of  the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than from 
corresponding improvements in transport and distribution’. 
8 See D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World, cit., pp. 71-96; Reed, ‘Transactions Costs’, 
pp. 177-190, but esp. pp. 180-186; D. NORTH, Structure and Change, cit., ch. 1-5; ID., Cost of  Exchange in His-
tory, cit., pp. 255-264. In his more recent writings, North has given added emphasis to the ‘immense re-
sources devoted to promulgating codes of  conduct’ (ideological attitudes concerning property rights and 
contracts). Finally see ID., Transaction Costs in History, cit., p. 558, for a much narrower definition of  transac-
tion costs than the one employed here: ‘the costs of  specifying and enforcing the contracts that underlie all 
exchange’.  
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transportation and all other transaction costs in European long-distance 
trade, and especially in fair-oriented overland trade. The obvious converse 
deduction to be drawn from that central thesis, therefore, is that long-distance 
fair-oriented trade flourished most successfully during the preceding and suc-
ceeding eras of  relative peace, relative security, and thus of  relatively lower 
transaction costs. To facilitate this task we must recall and reconsider in depth 
the truly seminal but sadly neglected thesis that Herman Van der Wee pub-
lished, with Theo Peeters, a full thirty years ago (1970), in Annales: ‘An eco-
nomic model of  the intersecular growth of  world trade from the twelfth to 
eighteenth centuries’.9 In basically just sixteen pages of  text, followed by an-
other eight pages of  rather abstruse mathematics and econometric analyses 
(and then a brief, summary conclusion), the two authors may not have suc-
ceeded, however, in convincing most readers that they had truly unlocked the 
secrets of  European economic growth – all the more so since this article ap-
peared well before Douglass North had published his key, path-breaking 
studies on institutional economics and transaction costs, chiefly in and from 
1973.10 
Anticipating some elements of  the Van der Wee and North theses, both 
Postan and especially Lopez had propounded the dictum that the ‘Birth of  
Europe’ itself  and the ensuing ‘Commercial Revolution’ era had fundamen-
tally depended upon the ability of  post-Carolingian Western Europe to repel 
its major chronic invaders (Norsemen, Muslims, Magyars) and to establish 
relative peace and security. If  warfare was subsequently never absent from the 
European scene, chiefly in the form of  sporadic, small-scale feudal conflicts, 
Western Europe also benefited from the ability to export most of  its military 
energies abroad in the Crusades, which, somewhat surprisingly did more to 
foster than to inhibit the expansion of  long-distance maritime trade, espe-
cially with the Muslim world, by ensuring a decisive Christian naval suprem-
acy in the Mediterranean basin. Yet, Lopez and Postan implicitly and Van der 
Wee far more explicitly demonstrated that the chief  dynamic elements in the 
expansion of  long-distance trade, and thereby, by backward and forward link-
ages with other sectors, of  the European economy were actually based much 
more on overland, continental trade routes.  
                                                     
9 H. VAN DER WEE, TH. PEETERS, Un modèle dynamique de croissance interseculaire du commerce mondiale, 
XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, in “Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations”, 15, 1970, pp. 100-128. See also a further 
elaboration of  these views in H. VAN DER WEE, Structural Changes in European Long-Distance Trade, and Par-
ticularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North, 1350-1750, in The Rise of  Merchant Empires: Long-Distance 
Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, ed. J. TRACY, Cambridge 1990, pp. 14-33. 
10 See above, nn. 3-5, 8. 
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Under such conditions of  relative peace and security, rapid commercial 
expansion, and economic growth over the next three centuries, European 
fairs, chiefly based on overland trade, both regional and continental, prolifer-
ated and flourished; and they did so the most impressively during the latter 
half  of  the Commercial Revolution era, often referred to as the ‘long thir-
teenth century’, from c.1180 to c.1320. Most economic historians would now 
agree that in this period Western Europe experienced its most dramatic and 
propulsive growth, economic and demographic, accompanied by the stimulus 
of  at first mild and then more severe inflation. For many historians, Michael 
Postan and his disciples in particular, such rising prices provided good proof  
for their theorem of  the immanent overexpansion of  a still technologically 
inert European economy: one that was unable ultimately to sustain continu-
ous population growth, so that it fell victim to a full-blown Malthusian crisis 
by the early fourteenth century.11 Though Europe certainly did experience a 
severe crisis by the early fourteenth century, the current evidence now indi-
cates that it was due more to warfare and to structural problems in interna-
tional trade than to any adverse Malthusian demographic factors. 
 
Revisiting the North-Milgrom-Weingast Model: on Medieval Fairs & the Law Merchant 
Furthermore, not all historians who have focused on the propulsive role 
of  international trade in promoting economic growth during the Commercial 
Revolution have given the economics, and especially the institutional econom-
ics, of  fairs their ‘fair’ due, as it were. The most famous of  this era were, of  
course, the Five Fairs of  Flanders, the English Midlands Fairs, and above all 
the Champagne Fairs, though there were many others of  importance, if  too 
numerous to be considered here.12  
Douglass North did not himself  neglect the significance of  the Cham-
pagne Fairs; for ten years ago, with two colleagues, Paul Milgrom and Barry 
Weingast, he published an important article on ‘The Law Merchant, Private 
                                                     
11 See in particular M. POSTAN, Essays on Medieval Agriculture and General Problems of  the Medieval Econ-
omy, Cambridge 1973, especially pp. 186 - 213; and also below, pp.  
12 See CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, in The Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, III, Economic 
Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages, ed. M.M. POSTAN, E.E. RICH, E. MILLER, Cambridge 1963, pp. 
119-153, especially pp. 126-37. Between 1066 and 1127 the counts of  Flanders had chartered monthly ‘free 
fairs’ at Lille, Ypres, Messines, and Torhout (but only subsequently at Bruges). For the English fairs, see in 
particular E.W. MOORE, The Fairs of  Medieval England: An Introductory Study, Toronto 1985 (Pontifical Insti-
tute of  Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts, 72). For the Champagne Fairs, see in particular R.-H. BAU-
TIER, Les foires de Champagne: recherches sur une evolution historique, in “Bulletin de la société Jean Bodin”, V, 
1953: La foire, pp. 97-145; in English trans. as The Fairs of  Champagne, in Essays in French Economic History, ed. 
R. CAMERON, Homewood (Ill.) 1970, pp. 42-63. 
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Judges, and the Champagne Fairs’.13 Their fundamental contention is that ‘an 
enduring pattern of  trade over a wide geographical area cannot be sustained 
if  it is profitable for merchants to renege on promises or repudiate agree-
ments’ -- in short, to cheat; and further that, ‘to capture the gains associated 
with geographic specialization [in long distance trade], a system had to be 
provided that ...provided for the enforcement of  agreements across space 
and time [and that]...lowered information costs [about such enforcement]’. 
Indeed, all forms of  commerce, for which so many individuals have the 
short-run temptation to cheat, require mechanisms or institutions to ‘pro-
mote the trust necessary for efficient exchange’. For simple bilateral ex-
changes in local trade, involving merchants well known to each other, that 
mechanism is usually the personal bond: in the commonplace sense that ‘a 
man’s word is his bond’, a bond that develops from continuing personal rela-
tionships that produce a strongly positive reputation for integrity. But how 
can such a ‘reputation system’ of  personal bonds be transferred and transmit-
ted to large-scale, long-distance, multi-lateral trades with so many participants, 
few of  whom would have known each other?  
In the North-Milgrom-Weingast model, for the Commercial Revolution 
era itself, the most efficient commercial institution, with the lowest transac-
tion costs, was the evolving international Law Merchant, and more specifi-
cally the law-merchant courts to be found in the international fairs. The 
function of  such courts was by no means merely the adjudication of  disputes 
but more importantly the low-cost communication of  vital information to 
the entire international community of  merchants trading there: information 
derived from suits held before such courts, on both the good and bad behav-
iour of  merchants, and then transmitted via their own national mercantile 
guilds and consulates elsewhere, to those who would never have the oppor-
tunity of  previously encountering such miscreant, untrustworthy merchants 
in person. Hence ‘transferable reputations for honesty can serve as an ade-
quate bond for honest behaviour if  members of  the trading community can be kept 
informed about each other’s past behaviour.’ Certain transaction costs were necessar-
ily involved in this transmission: (1) in inculcating the proper response of  all 
members of  the community to behave honestly, lest they themselves lose cus-
tomers, clients, and contracts; but more important (2) in ensuring that they be 
kept properly informed about the decisions of  law merchant courts, to hon-
our and respect those decisions concerning the behaviour of  their colleagues, 
and thus to boycott or ostracise those found guilty of  cheating and of  other-
                                                     
13 P.R. MILGROM, D.C. NORTH, B.R. WEINGAST, The Role of  Institutions in the Revival of  Trade: The Law 
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, in “Economic & Politics”, 2/1, 1990, pp. 1-23. 
THE ‘NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS’ 411 
wise reneging on contracts or informal promises. Thus, in the absence of  
formal state-authorized sanctions, they were required to punish the miscre-
ants by excluding them from all commerce. 
While most medieval fairs might have claimed to offer similar risk-
averting and cost-saving measures for conducting commerce, the Champagne 
Fairs, in their view, enjoyed the greatest advantages of  them all: in providing 
better organized and better trained law-merchants courts; in providing more 
efficient mechanisms for excluding miscreants and enforcing contracts; by 
attracting such a large and varied international community of  merchants with 
their institutions (guilds, consulates, etc) for the international transmission of  
crucial information; and above all, by offering those requisite ‘economies of  
scope and scale that smaller fairs could not offer’, at such low unit transaction 
costs. Such considerations, obviously, are more important than mere consid-
erations of  scale-economies in conducting trade and in effecting the associ-
ated financial transactions. Most of  their very intriguing article is devoted to 
mathematical exercises in Game Theory (‘The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game’) – 
and both the problems of  cheating and shirking seem to be central to mod-
ern Game Theory – to prove their points that, in almost all circumstances, it 
paid merchants to be honest while trading at fairs equipped with law-
merchant courts that supervised such commercial activities.14 
North and his co-authors, in writing a very succinct game-theoretical arti-
cle, did not wish to bother their readers with trivial historical details about the 
ways in which the Champagne and other Fairs actually functioned. But the 
fruits of  research from more mundane narrative historians may be cited, nev-
ertheless, to substantiate key components of  their model: in particular, those 
offered by Robert-Henri Bautier, one of  the most renowned and best in-
formed historians of  the Champagne Fairs and of  their international trade in 
textiles.15 He has effectively demonstrated that these Fairs’ great success did 
not rest so much on their location -- for other potential fair towns lay on the 
same or even better overland routes between the northwestern textile-
producing towns and their key Mediterranean markets --. Instead, their pros-
perity depended on the ability of  the counts of  Champagne to provide and 
guarantee all merchants, and their mercantile organisations, personal security 
and security of  their property rights, not only in their commerce at the Fairs 
but also, with full royal support (from 1209), in travelling to and from Cham-
                                                     
14 They also refer the reader to the following excellent article, to illustrate some of  their key points, in 
a very different place and time, Muslim North Africa during the 11th century: A. GREIF, Reputation and 
Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, in “Journal of  Economic History”, 49/4, 1989, 
pp. 857-882. 
15 R.-H. BAUTIER, Les foires de Champagne, cit., pp. 42-63. 
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pagne.16 In particular, the counts sought to ensure that all commercial con-
tracts signed at the Fairs were judicially valid throughout western Christen-
dom. They empowered the Fair Wardens to ‘outlaw’ defaulting merchants, 
and even their fellow citizens, when judicial institutions in their own towns 
failed to compel them to honour debts contracted at the Fairs. The enforce-
ment of  mercantile security and mercantile contracts does not seem to have 
suffered any impairment from Champagne’s absorption into the royal domain 
in 1273, on the death of  Count Henry III without a male heir.17 Indeed, one 
may well contend that the continued success of  the Fairs depended much 
more broadly upon the general peace and security of  this ongoing Commer-
cial Revolution era. 
 
The ‘Decline of  the Champagne Fairs’: Institutional, Financial, and Transportation Mod-
els 
In an ever changing and developing world, however, few such institu-
tional advantages could possibly survive into the early-modern era -- or so 
most historians have contended. In the conclusion of  their article, North-
Milgrom-Weingast contend that the Champagne Fairs, and by implication, the 
fair-system itself, were eventually bound to be replaced by a system of  state 
enforcement’, i.e. with the emerging centralized and more powerful central 
monarchical or state governments, ‘typically in the late middle ages’. In their 
view, such state enforcement of  commercial contracts and codes of  conduct 
became more efficient, with lower transaction costs, because the state ‘could 
seize the property of  individuals who resisted paying judgements, or put them 
in jail’; and thus, ‘if  judgements could be enforced in this way, then, in princi-
ple, the costs of  keeping merchants informed about another’s past behaviour 
could be saved.’18 
In a similar vein, most historians over the past century have propounded 
similar views to the effect that the Champagne Fairs were doomed to disap-
pear, with the inexorable progress of  European economic development, in 
                                                     
16 Ibid.: on several occasions (specifically in 1227 and 1262) the counts even intervened to ensure the 
presence at the fairs of  French or Italian merchants who had been subjected to papal interdicts. See also H. 
DUBOIS, Les institutions des foires médiévales: protection ou exploitation du commerce, and P. JEANNIN, La diffusion de 
l’information, both in Fiere e mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, secc. XIII – XVIII. ed. S. CAVACIOC-
CHI, Firenze 2001 (Istituto internazionale di Storia Economica “F. Datini”, Atti delle Settimane di Studi e 
altri convegni, 32), pp. 
17 On seizing Champagne, Philip III also arranged the marriage of  the heiress Joan with his own son, 
the future Philip IV the Fair (1285-1314), who subsequently did damage the Fairs, with both the warfare 
and especially the post-1295 coinage debasements, discussed below. See E. FOURNIAL, Histoire monétaire de 
l’occident médiéval, Paris 1970, pp. 112-139. 
18 P.R. MILGROM, D.C. NORTH, B.R. WEINGAST, The Role of  Institutions, cit., pp. 18-21. 
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particular with the concomitant technological and institutional changes that 
nullified their prior advantages. Thus if  the Fairs’ chief  prior advantage, in a 
more primitive era of  economic development, had been to canalize and coa-
lesce otherwise small and scattered trickles of  long-distance trade, especially 
in overland continental trade, into a few large and fasting flowing Fair ori-
ented-rivers, then surely the growth of  much bigger and better organized, 
more commercialized towns and cities would offer even greater advantages 
for conducting international trade. As one of  the first scholars to propose 
such a thesis, the famous Max Weber contended that international fairs, such 
as the Champagne Fairs, became redundant with the development of  the 
‘consignment system’ in the export trades by which ‘goods are sent abroad on 
a speculation... to a third party, the consignor, who must market them accord-
ing to the directions of  the consignor’. Consequently, ‘consignor and con-
signee do not meet as the earlier traders did, at the fair’. No evidence was 
offered to substantiate such views, delivered in a series of  posthumously-
published lectures -- not even a hint of  details that would allow us to deter-
mine when, where, how, and why such a dramatic transition occurred.19  
Such specific determinants, however, may be found in the publications of  
Raymond De Roover, by far the most influential modern proponent of  these 
‘inexorable progress’ theories. According to his famous ‘Commercial Revolu-
tion’ thesis, the great Italian merchant-banking companies, who had domi-
nated the commerce of  the Fairs, effected two major and institutional 
innovations, both of  which, by early fourteenth century, made the commerce 
and financial transactions of  these Fairs redundant. They may be viewed 
through the currently fashionable lens of  the principal-agent model in theo-
retical Economics.20  
The first and most monumental change was the shift from itinerant fair-
oriented trade to what he called ‘sedentary’ trade, as these firms established a 
network of  branch offices with permanently stationed local fattore agents. 
Empowered with a much greater stock of  more reliable market information, 
and perhaps with advantages of  asymmetrical knowledge, certainly in relation 
to still itinerant mercantile rivals, they could far more effectively, and with 
                                                     
19 See M. WEBER, General Economic History, translated by Frank H. Knight, from the original German 
edition of  1923 (New York 1961), pp. 168-169, 218-219. See also S.R. EPSTEIN, Regional Fairs, Institutional 
Innovation, and Economic Growth in Late-Medieval Europe, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 47/3, 1994, 
pp. 459-482, especially 459-462 (to which I owe the Weber reference). 
20 For the following, see: R. DE ROOVER, The Commercial Revolution of  the Thirteenth Century, in “Bulle-
tin of  the Business Historical Society”, 16, 1942, pp. 34-39; reprinted in Enterprise and Secular Change , ed. 
F.C. LANE, J. RIEMERSMA, New York 1953, pp. 80-85; and R. DE ROOVER, The Organization of  Trade, in 
Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, III, Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages, ed. M.M. 
POSTAN, E.E. RICH, Cambridge 1963, pp. 42-118. See n. 21. 
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much lower financial costs, transact commerce between the various branch 
offices and with their home offices in Italy, especially for the export of  
northern textiles to the Mediterranean and the import of  southern and Asian 
luxury goods to the north-west Europe.  
Second, and as a concomitant part of  such principal-agent relationships, 
these Italian merchant banking houses soon adopted the more ‘advanced’ bill-
of-exchange to displace the old fashioned, cumbersome, and very costly pay-
ment mechanism known as the instrumentum ex causa cambii.21 Because this in-
strumentum had been a formal bond of  indebtedness, as both a loan or 
investment contract and a financial- transfer mechanism, it had to be nota-
rized to have a valid standing in law courts. Furthermore, both because it was 
a fair-oriented three-party document, and because otherwise the legal stand-
ing of  agents abroad was not secure, its use required the personal presence of  
the second principal, the debtor, to effect both the transaction of  the Fair 
commerce and the Fair transfer-payments. Its Italian-devised successor in the 
bill-of-exchange or cambium was far simpler to use; and although its use did 
involve some additional transaction costs, on a net-basis, it was still the much 
cheaper financial instrument. Instead of  being a formal notarized and bonded 
obligation to pay, the cambium was instead a simple holograph document 
commanding payment: in effect a letter by which the principal merchant in 
city A (the taker), having received investment funds or funds for remittance 
from another principal (the deliverer), instructed his resident payer agent in city 
B abroad to make payment on his behalf  to the payee agent of  that merchant 
from whom he had received the original funds (i.e. the deliverer).22 
                                                     
21 Such bills were also known as cambium, lettera di cambio or di pagamento, lettre de change, Wech-
selbrief, wisselbrief. See R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking, and Credit in Medieval Bruges, in “Journal of  Eco-
nomic History”, 2, 1942, Supplement, pp. 52-65; ID., Le contrat de change depuis la fin du treizième siècle jusqu’au 
début du dix-septième, in “Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire”, 25, 1946-47, pp. 111-128; ID., Money, Bank-
ing and Credit in Mediaeval Bruges: Italian Merchant-Bankers, Lombards, and Money Changers: A Study in the Origins 
of  Banking, Cambridge MA 1948; id., L’evolution de la lettre de change, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles, Paris 1953; ID., New 
Interpretations of  the History of  Banking, in “Journal of  World History”, 2, 1954, pp. 38-76; reprinted in Busi-
ness, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Selected Studies of  Raymond de Roo-
ver, ed. J. KIRSHNER, Chicago 1974, pp. 200-238. See also J. MUNRO, Bullionism and the Bill of  Exchange in 
England, 1272-1663: A Study in Monetary Management and Popular Prejudice, in The Dawn of  Modern Banking, ed. 
CENTER FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES OF UCLA, New Haven/London 1979, pp. 169-239; 
reprinted in J. MUNRO, Bullion Flows and Monetary Policies in England and the Low Countries, 1350 - 1500, Alder-
shot 1992 (Variorum Collected Studies CS 355); and also The Medieval and Early Modern Bill of  Exchange: at 
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/munro5/ 
22 See example of  bills-of-exchange, based on the Datini archives in Prato, involving Italian mer-
chants in Bruges and Barcelona, in 1399-1400: in R. DE ROOVER, Money, Banking and Credit in Mediaeval 
Bruges, cit., pp. 56, 72. Typically, a bill-of-exchange transaction involved four, rather than three, parties: two 
principals in one city A and their two agents in the other, foreign city B. In city A, the first merchant 
‘lends’, as the deliverer (dattore), a specified sum to another merchant, known as the taker (prenditore or 
traente), or invests in his foreign trade venture, receiving in return not a bond but a copy of  the aforesaid 
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In De Roover’s view, the spread and final victory of  the bill-of-exchange 
necessarily depended upon the concomitant victory of  the ‘sedentary-
commercial’ system, with the well organized network of  branch offices run 
by resident fattore, over itinerant, fair-oriented forms of  commerce. In fact, 
however, a closer examination of  late-medieval bills of  exchange, especially 
those in the Datini archives, indicates that many such principal-agent bills did 
not involve, or necessarily involve, such mercantile branch offices. For often 
the agents for both parties in city B were independent merchant bankers, who 
maintained deposit accounts on behalf  of  these and many other clients. 
Hence, one may argue, as many canon lawyers did, that the cambium was not a 
true loan contract, in the defined sense of  the Roman-Law mutuum; that in-
stead it was an investment contract by which the deliverer was, in effect, pur-
chasing a claim on another merchant’s bank account assets in that foreign city 
B. Consequently, if  no loan was involved, no usury was present. In De Roo-
ver’s view, however, the cambium was a loan contract, but one that had the ma-
jor advantage of  ‘disguising’ the true interest rate within the exchange rate, 
which was normally ‘raised’ in favour of  the lender-deliverer, on both the 
original outgoing cambium (from A to B) and the return or incoming recambium 
(from B back to A, to remit the funds to the original deliverer). Those engaged 
in such bills-of-exchange transactions could still escape formal charges of  
usury so long as the exchange rate and thus the implicit interest rate on the 
recambium was not predetermined – the crucial test, along with the presence 
of  a genuine mutuum contract, for evidence of  usury.23   
Whatever one’s view of  this debate about the true nature of  the later-
medieval bill-of-exchange, quite clearly De Roover was correct, at least, in 
                                                                                                                         
cambium, by which the taker instructs his agent in B to make payment, on his behalf, to the deliverer’s 
agent [technically: he ‘draws for payment upon’ his agent in city B]. In City B, the deliverer’s banking agent, 
serving as the payee (beneficiario), receives a copy of  the cambium and presents it for ‘acceptance’ (not yet 
for payment) to the taker’s agent, the payer or drawee (pagatore or trattario), who writes his ‘acceptance’, 
with the date, on the back of  the bill (e.g. Acettata a di 11 di gennaio 1399), thus signalling his obligation to 
make the required payment, on the due or maturity date, to the deliverer’s agent, the said payee. See the 
previous note. 
23 In a mutuum contract the borrower obliged himself  by a true bond to repay the exact sum of  the 
principal lent to him, and the lender was forbidden to exact more than the principal sum, for in such a 
contract the ownership of  the capital sum so lent passed from the lender to the borrower; and the lender 
thus could not exact any of  the fruits of  that ownership, as an investor in a partnership or in a commenda 
contract would be entitled to do, by virtue of  purchasing an equity or ownership share in the venture or 
enterprise. If, in a set of  bill of  exchanges, the exchange rate on the recambium was determined at the 
same time as the rate on the original cambium, then, in the eyes of  the Church, it became a mutuum loan 
contract, and such predetermined exchange rates were indeed deemed to include usury or interesse. See in 
particular, J.A. BRUNDAGE, Usury, in Dictionary of  the Middle Ages, I-XIII, ed. J.R. STRAYER, et al, New York 
1982-89, XII, 1989, pp. 335-339; J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis of  Usury, Cambridge Mass. 1957, Part 
One: chapters I-III, and V, pp. 11-81, 100-133; T.P. MCLAUGHLIN, The Teaching of  the Canonists on Usury 
(XII, XIII and XIV Centuries), in “Medieval Studies”, 1, 1939, pp. 81-147; 2, 1940, pp. 1-22. 
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implying that the net transaction costs involved in using the bill-of-exchange 
both for investments in trade (or for providing commercial loans) and for 
remitting funds between cities were much lower than those for the fair-
oriented instrumentum ex causa cambii. To be sure, both the instrumentum ex causa 
cambii and then the subsequent cambium had provided an enormous savings in 
commercial-financial transaction costs in greatly reducing, if  not eliminating, 
international payments in transported precious metals: inherently so high 
cost, because of  the tremendous risks of  theft, confiscation (in violating in-
creasingly common bans on bullion exports), and other forms of  loss while 
en route.  
But the instrumentum remained and could not be disguised as anything but 
a formal loan contract: a mutuum in whose exchange rates any competent 
canon lawyer would detect the presence of  usury (i.e. pure interest). The once 
commonplace view that the canonical usury doctrine was not taken seriously 
by medieval merchants is one that cannot be sustained, especially in view of  
the considerable research that demonstrates the significant intensification of  
both the ecclesiastical and secular campaigns against usury from the early 
thirteenth century, the era of  the Fairs, and culminating in the later Middle 
Ages.24 We should also not forget the fundamentally religious character of  the 
fairs themselves, especially in that all of  the words for fairs refer to holy days 
(holidays), religious festivals, celebrations, or masses: feria(e), fiere, ferias, foires, 
Messen, kermis-se.25 While the usury doctrine did not prevent the use of  loan 
contracts in financing trade and industry, their use certainly did involve sig-
nificant impediments and thus much higher transaction costs than did licit 
investment contracts, because of  the inherent risks that a ‘usurious’ merchant 
                                                     
24 See in particular R. DE ROOVER, The Scholastics, Usury, and Foreign Exchange, in “Business History 
Review”, 41, 1967, pp. 257-271; ID., The Scholastic Attitude toward Trade and Entrepreneurship, in “Explorations 
in Entrepreneurial History”, 2nd ser., 1, 1963, pp. 76-87; and J. KIRSHNER, Raymond de Roover on Scholastic 
Economic Thought, reprinted in Business, Banking, and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe: 
Selected Studies of  Raymond de Roover, ed. ID., Chicago 1974; J.F. MCGOVERN, The Rise of  New Economic Atti-
tudes in Canon and Civil Law, A.D. 1200-1550, in “The Jurist”, 32, 1972, pp. 39-50; J. LE GOFF, The Usurer and 
Purgatory, in The Dawn of  Modern Banking, ed. CENTER FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES, 
UCLA, New Haven 1979, pp. 25-52; ID., Your Money or Your Life: Economy and Religion in the Middle Ages, 
trans. by Patricia Ranum, New York 1988; F.L. GALASSI, Buying a Passport to Heaven: Usury, Restitution, and the 
Merchants of  Medieval Genoa, in “Religion”, 22, October 1992, pp. 313-326; L. ARMSTRONG, The Politics of  
Usury in Trecento Florence: the Questio de Monte of  Francesco da Empoli, in “Mediaeval Studies”, 61, 1999, pp. 1-
44. 
25 Cf. P. HARTMANN, Les privilèges, droit de marché, règlements des foires et marchés à l’époque moderne, in Fiere e 
mercati nella integrazione delle economie europee, cit., pp. , citing Encyclopédie methodique, Paris 1786: ‘le mot foire 
vient de forum, place publique, a été dans son origine synonime de celui de marché...’. But this quite valid 
citation does not contradict the religious significance that was attached to European fairs and the words for 
them. See fere, feriae, festus: in CH. LEWIS, CH. SHORT, A Latin Dictionary, Oxford 1996: 1st edn. 1879; 
R.E. LATHAM, Revised Medieval Latin Word-List from British and Irish Sources, Oxford 1965, pp. 188-189. 
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would encounter: (1) in ecclesiastical and secular punishments or sanctions, 
and/or (2) moral ostracism, and (3) in the renunciation of  usurious contracts 
that could not be upheld in courts of  law. 
Conversely, however, and for this very same reason, the simple holograph 
bill-of-exchange, and similar, if  more loan-oriented, commercial contracts, 
such as the letter obligatory (what later became known as the promissory note) had 
no standing in any courts of  law, including law-merchant courts, in this era, 
certainly not in the late thirteenth, early-fourteenth centuries. What courts did 
require as unassailable evidence of  an obligation to make payment, or repay-
ments, was the bond, and in particular formally notarized bonds, such as the 
instrumentum ex causa cambii, or its much longer-lasting English counterpart, the 
recognizance, whose repayment provisions were encoded in Parliamentary law, 
from as early as the Statute of  Acton Burnell (Statutum de Mercatoribus) of  
1283; and in the subsequent decisions of  Common Law Courts.26 Therefore 
the risk of  renunciation or of  non-payment of  bills-of-exchange and similar 
holograph bills -- as ‘dishonoured bills’ – was far higher, all the more so if  the 
bills had been transferred in payment for other transactions to third parties, 
as ‘bearer bills’. That was a severe problem that would not begin to be re-
solved until the 1430s, and was not fully resolved until the sixteenth century, 
under circumstances involving both law-merchant courts and, perhaps sur-
prisingly, fairs.27 
For most medieval economic historians, however, the chief  explanation 
for the disappearance of  the Champagne Fairs, and by implication at least, of  
all inland-oriented international fairs, is to be found in an even more impor-
tant technological revolution, in shipping and navigation: i.e. the establish-
ment of  a direct sea route from the Italian maritime republics to the chief  
ports of  northern Europe, especially to Bruges, Southampton, and London.28 
                                                     
26 Statutum de Mercatoribus, 11 Edward I, 12 October 1283: in GREAT BRITAIN, RECORD COMMIS-
SION, Statutes of  the Realm, I-VI, London 1810-22, I, pp. 53-54. See J. MUNRO, The International Law Merchant 
and the Evolution of  Negotiable Credit in Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, in Banchi pubblici, banchi 
privati e monti di pietà nell'Europa preindustriale: amministrazione, tecniche operative e ruoli economici, ed. D. PUNCUH, 
in “Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria”, n.s., XXXI , 1991 (Genoa: Società Ligure di Storia Patria), pp. 
49-80; reprinted in J. MUNRO, Textiles, Towns, and Trade: Essays in the Economic History of  Late-Medieval England 
and the Low Countries, Aldershot 1994 (Variorum Collected Studies CS 442); M. POSTAN, Private Financial 
Instruments in Medieval England, in “Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte”, 22, 1930; re-
printed in M.M. POSTAN, Medieval Trade and Finance, Cambridge 1973, pp. 28-64. 
27 See below, pp. 443-444, for the final section of  this paper. 
28 R. DOEHAERD, Les galères génoises dans la Manche et la Mer du Nord à la fin du XIIIe siècle et au début du 
XIVe siècle, in “Bulletin de l’Institut historique belge de Rome”, 19, 1938, pp. 5-76; G. YVER, Le commerce et 
les marchands dans l’Italie mériodoniale au XIIIe et au XIVe siècle, Paris 1903; A. SCHAUBE, Die Anfänge der 
venezianischen Galeerenfahrten nach der Nordsee, in “Historische Zeitschrift”, 3rd ser., 101, 1908, pp. 28-89; R. 
CESSI, Le relazioni commerciali tra Venezia e le Fiandre nel secolo XIV, in “Nuovo Archivio Veneto”, n.s., 27, 
1914; E.H. BYRNE, Genoese Shipping in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Cambridge MA 1930; D. 
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If  the Genoese and the Majorcans were evidently the first to do so, from 
about 1274, a regular, more or less continuous galley service between the ma-
jor Italian maritime republics and the northern ports of  Bruges, then South-
ampton, and London was not established until after 1317; and then the 
Venetians, after founding their Bruges consulate in 1322, came to dominate 
that northern galley trade.29 
 
The Bautier-Verlinden ‘Textile Industrialization’ Model and the International Trade in 
Textiles 
For both R.H. Bautier and Charles Verlinden, the truly decisive factor, 
though one in their view clearly related to the establishment of  the Italian gal-
ley routes, was the ‘industrialization of  Italy’.30 Its most important aspect was 
the establishment of  high-quality, luxury-oriented woollen cloth industries, in 
Florence, and in a considerable number of  other Tuscan and Lombard towns. 
That industry became heavily dependent on imported English wools, then by 
far the world’s finest; and most historians would naturally assume that the 
cheapest, safest way of  importing them from far distant England was by gal-
leys. Not before the early fifteenth century, furthermore, would the primacy 
of  English wools begin to be seriously challenged, and from a much closer 
source: Spanish merino wools, whose use, however, was not so readily accepted 
in this era by all Italian (and certainly not by Netherlander) textile industries.31 
The problem with all of  these plausible and fanciful ‘progress-oriented’ 
theses to explain the decline of  the Champagne Fairs is that they all pertain to 
                                                                                                                         
STOECKLY, Le système de l’Incanto des galées du marché à Venise, fin XIIIe-milieu XVe siècle, Leiden-Cologne-New 
York 1995, an excellent but not readily available study. 
29 See the previous note; and also Armando SAPORI, Le marchand italien au moyen âge, École Pratique des 
Hautes Études, VIe section: Affaires et gens d’affaires, Paris 1952, part IV: ‘Routes et transports,’ pp. 64-74; R.S. 
LOPEZ, Studi sull’economia genovese nel medio evo, Turin 1936; and IDEM, The Trade of  Medieval Europe: The South, 
cit., pp. 374-479. 
30 CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, cit., pp. 133-34; R.-H. BAUTIER, Les foires de Champagne, cit., pp. 
61-63. 
31 See R. LOPEZ, The Origin of  the Merino Sheep, in The Joshua Starr Memorial Volume: Studies in History 
and Philology, New York 1953 (a publication of  Jewish Social Studies, 5), pp. 161-168; F. MELIS, La lana della 
Spagna mediterranea e della Barberia occidentale nei secoli XIV-XV, in La lana come materia prima: I fenomeni della sua 
produzione e circolazione nei secoli XIII-XVII, ed. M. SPALLANZANI, Firenze 1974, pp. 241-251; C. RAHN 
PHILLIPS, W.D. PHILLIPS, Spain's Golden Fleece: Wool Production and the Wool Trade from the Middle Ages to the 
Nineteenth Century, Baltimore/London 1997; but see also H. HOSHINO, L'arte della lana in Firenze nel basso 
medioevo:il commercio della lana e il mercato dei panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV, Firenze 1980, for the various 
wools in the Florentine cloth industry in the 14th and 15th centuries, including domestic Italian wools. 
Spanish merino had certainly become predominant in the Florentine cloth industry, as well as in the Low 
Countries, by the 16th century. See R. DE ROOVER, A Florentine Firm of  Cloth Manufacturers: Management of  a 
Sixteenth-Century Business, in “Speculum”, 16, 1941, pp. 3-33; reprinted in his Business Banking, cit., pp. 85-
118. 
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developments that came long after the Fairs’ decadence had been exposed in 
full view.32 Therefore, they should instead be considered more as conse-
quences than as prior causes of  either the decline itself; or at least the indirect 
consequences of  the forces that had led to their decline, by the very early 
fourteenth century. Furthermore, the term for the final explanation given for 
the Fair’s decline, Bautier-Verlinden’s ‘industrialization of  Italy’, is itself  very 
misleading, and especially so in the sphere of  textiles. For almost two centu-
ries, from the twelfth to early fourteenth, Florence had achieved great fame 
for its Arte di Calimala, a mercantile-industrial organization that was based 
upon on importing, dyeing, finishing and then re-exporting Franco-Flemish 
woollens. Furthermore, during this same era, Florence and many other Italian 
towns had experienced an impressive industrial growth in several flourishing 
textile industries that had exported a wide variety cheap and light worsted or 
semi-worsted fabrics to markets in the Mediterranean. Marketed with such 
names as saia, saia cotonata, stametto, trafilato, taccolino, tritana (cf. Flemish tire-
taines), they ranged in value from about 10 to 30 percent, at the most, of  the 
Franco-Flemish woollens imported by the Arte di Calimala.33 Of  even greater 
importance were fustians, equally cheap and light linen-cotton based fabrics, 
                                                     
32 Bautier, evidently supported in this thesis by Verlinden, added yet another, final monetary factor: 
the vicissitudes of  bimetallism, with radical changes in the gold:silver ratios, ‘which completely disorgan-
ized the balances of  the [Italian gold-based] companies whose activity rested on foreign exchange sales’. 
Indeed, earlier Bautier had established the point that ‘the main purpose of  the fairs of  Champagne was the 
provision of  specie for the Italian purchases of  French and Flemish draperies’. See R.-H. BAUTIER, Les 
foires de Champagne, cit., pp. 63, 62; Cf. also CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, cit., pp. 133-34. But this the-
sis also fails to provide an adequate explanation of  the Fairs’ decline for the same reason: these monetary 
changes came well after the onset of  the Fairs’ decline. Indeed the bimetallic monetary perturbations, 
which led to what Frederic Lane called the ‘first infidelities of  the Venetian lire,’ can be the most precisely 
dated: 1330-32, after which the bimetallic ratio (at Venice) plunged from a high of  14.2:1 to just 9.4:1 by 
1350, thus radically undermining the assets of  all gold-based commercial firms. Based upon the bimetallic 
ratios cited in P. SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, London 1986, Table II, p. lxiii; and ID., Money 
and Its Use in Medieval Europe, Cambridge 1988, pp. 271-282, with Graph II, p. 272; and Table 7, p. 354. See 
also F. LANE, The First Infidelities of  the Venetian Lire, in The Medieval City, ed. H. MISKIMIN, D. HERLIHY, 
A.L. UDOVITCH, New Haven/London 1977, pp. 54-55. He comments that ‘gold coins, which had been 
rising generally [in value, relative to those of  silver], took a sharp downward turn in Italy in 1326-32.’ Spuf-
ford, however, states that 1328 was the year in which gold values peaked; but the drop is not apparent until 
1330. They both ascribe this dramatic change in the bimetallic ratio to sudden increases of  both African 
‘Sudanese’ and Hungarian gold supplies on west European markets.  
33 See P. CHORLEY, The Cloth Exports of  Flanders and Northern France During the Thirteenth Century: A Lu-
xury Trade?, in “Economic History Review”, 2nd ser., 40, 1987, pp. 349-379; H. HOSHINO, Per la storia del-
l'arte della lana in Firenze nel trecento e nel quattrocento: un riesame, in “Annuario dell'Istituto giapponese di 
Roma”, 10, 1972-73; ID., L'arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo:il commercio della lana e il mercato dei panni 
fiorentini nei secoli XIII-XV, Firenze 1980; ID., The Rise of  the Florentine Woollen Industry in the Fourteenth Century, 
in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe, ed. N.B. HARTE, K.G. PONTING, London 1983, pp. 184-204; J.H. 
MUNRO, The Origins of  the English ‘New Draperies’: The Resurrection of  an Old Flemish Industry, 1270 - 1570, in 
The New Draperies, ed. N. HARTE, D. COLEMAN, Oxford 1997 (Pasold Studies in Textile History), pp. 35-
127; A. SAPORI, Una compagnia di calimala ai primi del trecento, Firenze 1932 (Biblioteca storica toscana, 7). 
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whose production, chiefly in Lombardy, and export sales abroad enjoyed a 
spectacular expansion during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.34  
 
The Great Medieval Turning-Point: the Warfare of  c.1290-1340 and Rising Transaction 
Costs 
What Bautier and Verlinden so misleadingly labelled ‘industrialization’ 
was in fact a dramatic industrial transformation that must be explained as the 
rational response to severe market adversities, with sharply rising transporta-
tion and transaction costs. These, in turn, were chiefly the deleterious conse-
quences of  a spreading stain of  continuous, chronic, ever more disruptive 
and costly series of  wars and other conflicts throughout the Mediterranean 
basin and western Europe, from the 1290s to the 1340s, and then merging 
into the better known and even more destructive era of  the Hundred Years’ 
War (1337-1453) and related wars in western Europe. Having extensively ana-
lysed this warfare and its consequences elsewhere, I need do no more here 
than point out the highlights. In the eastern Mediterranean, that warfare had 
commenced in 1291 with the Mamluk conquest of  Acre and the Latin King-
dom of  Jerusalem, terminating a vital European connection with the Near 
East and Asia; and worse, that conquest led to both papal and secular trade 
bans with the Muslims, which, while not totally severing trade, certainly raised 
the transaction costs of  conducting that vital commerce. Furthermore, the 
loss of  these crucial Palestinian ports almost immediately led to a bitter war 
between Venice and Genoa (1291-99) for control over alternative trade routes 
to Asia via the Black Sea. Barely had that conflict ended when, in 1303, the 
Ottoman Turks began their relentless conquest of  Asia Minor and, subse-
quently, parts of  Greece and the Balkans. In turn that was followed by Mon-
gol attacks against the Italian’s Black Sea colonies; by anarchy in the Mongol 
Khanate in Persia and the Caucasus; and by Mamluk conquests in Lesser Ar-
menia (Cilicia), effectively closing off  the last alternative route and subjecting 
the Christian West to a virtual Mamluk monopoly over the Asian trades, at 
Alexandria (the karimis cartel), certainly by 1344.35  
                                                     
34 M. MAZZAOUI, The Italian Cotton Industry in the Later Middle Ages, 1100 – 1600, Cambridge 1981, pp. 
18-69. 
35 Italian trade had become very important in these Mongol-ruled areas; and this warfare marked the 
initial crumbling of  the famed ‘Pax Mongolica’. In Persia, the end of  the Ilkhanid dynasty in 1335 was 
followed by a ‘long period of  anarchy’. Western merchants also utilized Crete, Cyprus, and Lajazzo (Cilicia 
or ‘Lesser Armenia’) as intermediaries to conduct trade with the Muslim Levant, but paid a higher price in 
doing so. Lajazzo was conquered by the Mamluks in 1347. See W. VON HEYD, Histoire du commerce du Levant 
au moyen-âge, I-II, Leipzig 1923, I, pp. 470-604; II, pp. 64-140, 156-215; E. ASHTOR, Observations on Venetian 
Trade in the Levant in the XIVth Century, in “Journal of  European Economic History”, 5, 1976, pp. 533-586; 
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In the Muslim reaches of  the western Mediterranean, equally destructive 
strife had commenced in 1291, when the aggressively expanding Berber 
Marinid state became embroiled in wars with Castile, Aragon, and Muslim 
Granada for control of  the Iberian peninsula, a vicious struggle prolonged by 
military strife between these anti-Marinid allies, until the Spanish Christian 
victory at Rio Salado, in 1340, dispelled that Berber-Marinid threat forever.36  
Perhaps even worse for western trade was an even earlier related conflict, 
the infamous Wars of  the Sicilian Vespers, commencing in 1282, and soon 
embroiling not only Sicily but Naples, the Papacy and its allies, the Angevin 
realms of  southern France, and Catalonia-Aragon. The ensuing papal Peace 
of  Caltobelleta in 1302 served only to unleash over ten thousand Catalan 
mercenaries: who, in being sent east to defend the Byzantine Empire against 
the Ottoman Turks, ended up ravaging parts of  Anatolia, Macedonia, Thrace, 
and Greece (1303-12), while a smaller group plundered the North African 
coasts for many years with their fleets of  corsairs. In Italy itself, Imperial 
German armies took advantage of  this Peace to launch an invasion of  Lom-
bardy and Tuscany, which then provoked a resumption of  the former intra-
Italian wars in the form of  the even more ferocious Guelf-Ghibelline Wars 
(Papal-Imperial, 1313-43) and then civil war within southern Habsburg Ger-
many itself. Such wars devastated Italy in particular for the next three dec-
ades, with almost continuous foreign intervention by Catalan, French, 
German, and Hungarian armies, along with constant devastations from mer-
cenary Free Companies of  disbanded soldiers, whose depredations continued 
long after the wars had formally ended. Nor had north-western Europe been 
spared such conflicts. For again, from the 1290s, the Anglo-French, Anglo-
Scottish, and Franco-Flemish wars (to 1319), which then led into the Flemish 
civil wars (1323-28), certainly did produce some sporadic disruptions in the 
commerce of  this entire region, especially in the Low Countries and along the 
routes leading to the Champagne Fairs in northeastern France. 
The most harmful consequences of  these overlapping, entangling sets of  
wars and conflicts were by no means the destruction that they wrought or 
                                                                                                                         
ID., The Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Princeton 1983, pp. 54-86; D. ABULAFIA, Asia, Africa, and the 
Trade of  Medieval Europe, in Cambridge Economic History of  Europe, II, Trade and Industry in the Middle Ages, ed. 
M.M. POSTAN, E. MILLER, 2nd edn. Cambridge 1987, pp. 459-62; D. ABULAFIA, Commerce and Conquest in 
the Mediterranean, 1100 - 1500, Aldershot 1993 (Variorum Collected Studies series 410). 
36 See CH.-E. DUFOURCQ, L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles: de la bataille de Las 
Navas de Tolosa (1212) à l'avènement du sultan mérinide Abou-l-Hasan (1331), Paris 1966, pp. 193-587; CH.-E. 
DUFOURCQ, J. GAUTIER DALCHÉ, Histoire économique et sociale de l'Espagne chrétienne au moyen âge, Paris 1976; 
A. LAROUI, The History of  the Maghrib: An Interpretative Essay, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Princeton 1977 
(Princeton University Press), pp. 193-218; and J.H. PRYOR, The Naval Battles of  Roger de Lauria, in “Journal 
of  Medieval History”, 9, 1983, pp. 179-216.  
JOHN H. MUNRO 
 
422 
even the physical impediments imposed on normal trade routes. More disas-
trous were the steadily rising transport and general transaction costs that en-
sued from their various ancillary consequences: from periodic but ever 
increasing trade embargoes, from ever more costly licences to transact trade 
with enemies (especially those in the Muslim-dominated Mediterranean 
ports), from increased tolls and taxes on trade, and from other fiscal and 
monetary policies, in particular from coinage debasements, adopted and long 
pursued to finance warfare, defence, and ever more costly modes of  protec-
tion, on land and at sea. As Van der Wee, Lopez, and North have also con-
tended, the negative consequences of  such economic turmoil and 
disruptions, and of  government responses, may have produced a more highly 
skewed distribution of  wealth and income. The abundant and very detailed 
statistical evidence on such rising transport and transaction costs in interna-
tional trade, from the 1290s into the fifteenth century, demonstrating a dou-
bling or more in even maritime freight rates, are provided in several of  my 
publications on these topics.37 
 
The Impact of  Rising Transaction Costs on the International Textiles Trades  
How then, as the major question to be posed, did this very adverse com-
bination of  rising transportation and transaction costs affect and adversely 
alter the existing patterns and structure of  international trade, particularly 
fair-oriented commerce? How did it affect the structure, orientation, and 
products of  the various textile industries, north and south, that had served 
and fuelled the very growth of  that trade? For the major textile industries of  
the western Mediterranean basin itself, principally in Italy and Catalonia, the 
impact of  such rising costs was two-fold, by the early to mid fourteenth cen-
                                                     
37 J. MUNRO, Industrial Transformations in the North-West European Textile Trades, c. 1290 - c. 1340: Eco-
nomic Progress or Economic Crisis?, in Before the Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of  the Early Fourteenth Century, 
ed. B.M.S. CAMPBELL, Manchester/New York 1991, pp. 110-148; reprinted in J. MUNRO, Textiles, Towns, and 
Trade: Essays in the Economic History of  Late-Medieval England and the Low Countries, Aldershot 1994; ID., The 
Origins of  the English ‘New Draperies’: The Resurrection of  an Old Flemish Industry, 1270 - 1570, in The New Drap-
eries in the Low Countries and England, 1300 – 1800, ed. N.B. HARTE, Oxford/New York 1997, pp. 35-127; H. 
VAN DER WEE, Modèle, cit., pp. 1-26; D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World, cit., pp. 78-80; 
R. LOPEZ, Hard Times and Investment in Culture, in The Renaissance: Medieval or Modern?, Heath Series, ed. K.H. 
DANNENFELDT, New York 1959, pp. 50-63; R. LOPEZ, H. MISKIMIN, A. UDOVITCH, England to Egypt, 
1350-1400: Long-Term Trends and Long-Distance Trade, in Studies in the Economic History of  the Middle East, ed. 
M.A. COOK, London 1970, pp. 93-128. See also: See CH.-E. DUFOURCQ, L'Espagne catalane, cit., pp. 534-
542: shipping costs ranged from £200 Barcelonese for small ships (30-40 sailors) to £400 for galleys (80-
120 rowers and 100-150 sailors); and monthly costs of  arming such ships against corsairs ranged from an 
additional £50 to £100. For Sicily, see H. BRESC, Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250-1450), in “Anuario de estu-
dios medievales”, 10, 1980, pp. 751-757; ID., Un monde méditerranéen: Économie et société en Sicile, 1300 - 1450, I-
II., Rome 1986 (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 262), I, pp. 350-352. 
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tury: (1) to promote the growth of  import substitution industries to replace 
some if  by no means all of  the high-grade Franco-Flemish woollen cloths, 
whose supplies, when not disrupted, were now much more costly to obtain ; 
and (2) to undermine seriously the export-oriented production of  the very 
cheap and coarse worsted, woollen, and worsted fabrics, which, to cite a 
common simile, could no longer ‘bear the freight’ in long-distance trade. Ob-
viously the highly diversified textile industries of  north-west Europe were 
even more seriously afflicted, because of  their vastly greater distances from 
their primary markets, in the Mediterranean basin. 
In general, the chief  transformations that took place in the West Euro-
pean textile industries, certainly for those dependent on distant international 
markets, if  not as much for those based on local or regional trade, was a re-
orientation away from the cheap, light, coarse fabrics to concentrate more and 
more on much higher-quality and much higher priced woollens. In northern 
France, the Low Countries, the adjacent Rhineland, and England, those that 
were the most dramatically affected were the various sayetteries, other worsted-
type draperies légères, and the cheaper, coarser linen and fustian (tiretaine) indus-
tries. Most, if  not all, were then producing virtually undifferentiated fabrics, 
i.e. with many close substitutes, for export to Mediterranean markets, where 
they had to compete with lower-cost domestic producers, those with lower 
transportation costs in particular. Furthermore, to worsen the plight of  these 
northern producers, such markets had evidently become saturated by the 
early fourteenth century, just when their combined production, transport, 
marketing, and other transaction costs were rising above the prevailing prices 
in the Mediterranean. In essence, those northern draperies that did survive, 
those with access to capital and market connections, were forced to trans-
form themselves from mere passive ‘price-takers’ into aggressive ‘price-
makers: i.e. to engage in ‘monopolistic competition’ producing much more 
differentiated, luxury-oriented woollens, with a far higher value:weight ratio, 
which could thus much better sustain these rising transport and transaction 
costs. Only a few would succeed in doing so and establish a secure market 
niche with their much-higher priced woollens. 
For Italy itself  such a radical industrial transformation is indeed clearly 
evident from the early fourteenth century. As Maureen Mazzaoui has shown, 
the once flourishing and widespread fustian industries began to experience a 
decline, at first gradual, but then steeper and inexorable, from at least the 
1320s.38 By that same decade, the Tuscan and Lombard semi-worsted indus-
tries, were in even more serious decline. As Hidetoshi Hoshino has also dem-
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onstrated, in various publications on the Italian cloth industries, first Flor-
ence, and then other Tuscan and Lombard towns began to reorient their tex-
tile production more and more, from the later 1320s, to much higher quality, 
indeed expensive woollens made from chiefly the better English wools. As 
early as the late 1330s, just a decade later, such woollens accounted for almost 
75 percent of  the aggregate value of  their urban textile production, though 
this shift was not complete until the mid-century.39 Embraced within this 
same transformation of  course was the decay of  the cloth-importing and 
cloth-finishing Arte di Calimala, as the Arte di Lana became pre-eminent in 
producing the same type of  luxury woollens, or even more luxurious varieties, 
from imported English wools. The very same and equally dramatic industrial 
transformations may be clearly observed in Catalan cloth production during 
this very same era.40 
Even more substantial and much more detailed evidence for this very 
same industrial transformation may be observed in north-western Europe, 
especially throughout the southern Low Countries, from the very early years 
of  the fourteenth century: (1) the virtual disappearance of  almost all the once 
prominent and flourishing sayetteries, other draperies légeres or draperies sèches, and 
the coarser linen industries, except for the sayetteries of  Hondschoote and Ar-
ras, which, though losing their southern markets, did manage to retain some 
local and northern, principally German markets; (2) the consequent relative 
shift of  textile production to the so-called draperies ointes (‘greased’ draperies), 
of  which the most important were in Ghent, Ypres, Bruges, Mechelen, Brus-
sels, and Leuven. By the 1350s, their high-priced, heavy-weight woollen 
broadcloths, such as the Ghent dickedinnen (30 ells = 21 m), would cost a mas-
ter mason over nine months daily wages (173 days’ wages) for just a single 
broadcloth. For many historians, to be sure, one of  the more striking aspects 
of  the Flemish industrial transformation was the rise, in small towns and the 
larger villages, of  the so-called nouvelles draperies, of  which Wervik, Kortrijk, 
Menen, and Comines were the most prominent. But they, too, had trans-
formed themselves from their former status as members of  the draperies légères 
to join the draperies ointes in similarly producing heavy-weight woollens, but as 
                                                     
39 H. HOSHINO, The Rise of  the Florentine Woollen Industry, cit., pp. 183 - 204; ID., L'arte della lana in 
Firenze, cit., pp. 35-120. 
40 C. CARRÈRE, Barcelone: centre économique à l'époque des difficultés, 1380 – 1462, Paris 1967, chapter 6: ‘La 
draperie barcelonaise,’ pp. 423-528; ID., La draperie en Catalogne et en Aragon au XVe siècle, in Produzione, com-
mercio e consumo dei panni di lana (nei secoli XII - XVIII), Atti della Seconda Settimana de Studio, 10-16 April 1970, 
ed. M. SPALLANZANI, Firenze 1976, pp. 475-509; M. RIU, The Woollen Industry in Catalonia in the Later Middle 
Ages, in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe: Essays in Memory of  Professor E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed. N.B. 
HARTE, K.G. PONTING, London 1983, pp. 205-229. 
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lower-priced imitations of  those sold by the major urban draperies: by resort-
ing to cheaper dyes, and especially by using lesser quantities of  somewhat 
cheaper wools. These cloths, in contrast to the image of  cheap, light fabrics, 
so falsely portrayed by Pirenne and his followers, were in fact better in quality 
and more expensive than later-medieval England’s esteemed broadcloths. In 
the 1360s, a Wervik woollen broadcloth (27 ells = 19 m) would have cost a 
Bruges or Ghent mason 85 days’ wages, and the lesser paid English (Oxford) 
mason 132 days’ wages.41 
In England itself, virtually all of  the old, traditional eastern seaboard ur-
ban draperies, chiefly producing very cheap and light cloths (including stam-
fords or stanfortes and says) had collapsed by the 1330s, though Norfolk’s 
native worsted industry managed to survive until the 1370s, by focusing on 
the still relatively peaceful Baltic and north German-Scandinavian markets. 
Thereafter, and especially from the 1390s, the precipitous decline of  the re-
maining worsted exports was mirrored by the dramatic rise of  woollen 
broadcloth exports.42 But in this era, very few English woollen broadcloths 
reached Mediterranean markets; and they did not in fact begin to make a real 
impact there until about the 1430s or 1440s.43 
In the continental north-west, the aforementioned industrial-
transformation strategy did allow a small number of  Norman, Brabantine, 
and Flemish producers, including, remarkably, the Flemish nouvelles draperies, to 
maintain or even gain some foothold in Mediterranean markets. Nevertheless, 
the luxury-oriented woollen draperies in northern France, the Low Countries 
– including the late-comer Leiden (Holland), which became a major partici-
pant from the 1360s -- and England, were also forced to rely on the more ac-
cessible, northern and especially Hanseatic-dominated markets in Germany, 
                                                     
41 See Tables 1-2 below; and J. MUNRO, Industrial Transformations, cit., pp. 110-48 (especially Table 4.1, 
p. 142); ID., New Draperies, cit., pp. 35-127; ID., The Symbiosis of  Towns and Textiles: Urban Institutions and the 
Changing Fortunes of  Cloth Manufacturing in the Low Countries and England, 1270 -1570, in “The Journal of  Early 
Modern History: Contacts, Comparisons, Contrasts”, 3/1, 1999, pp. 1-74; ID., Textiles as Articles of  Consump-
tion in Flemish Towns, 1330 - 1575, in “Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis”, 81/1-3, 1998, pp. 275-288. See also H. 
PIRENNE, Une crise industrielle au XVIe siècle: la draperie urbaine et la nouvelle draperie en Flandre, in “Bulletin de 
l'Academie royale de Belgique: Classe des Belles Lettres”, 1905, reprinted in Histoire économique de l'occident 
médiéval, ed. E. COORNAERT, Bruges 1951, pp. 621-643. 
42 See J. MUNRO, The ‘Industrial Crisis’ of  the English Textile Towns, 1290 - 1330, in Thirteenth-Century Eng-
land,VII, ed. M. PRESTWICH, R. BRITNELL, R. FRAME, Woodbridge UK 1999, pp. 103-141; ID., Symbiosis of  
Towns and Textiles, cit., pp. 1-74. 
43 E.B. FRYDE, Italian Maritime Trade with Medieval England (ca. 1270 - c. 1530), in “Recueils de la société 
Jean Bodin”, 32, 1974, pp. 291-337; E.B. FRYDE, The English Cloth Industry and the Trade with the Mediterra-
nean, c. 1370 - c. 1530, in Produzione, commercio e consumo de panni di lana, cit., pp. 343-367; both articles re-
printed in his Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance, London 1983. 
JOHN H. MUNRO 
 
426 
Scandinavia, Poland, and Livonia-Russia, i.e. those with relatively lower trans-
port and transaction costs, as did the few surviving sayetteries.  
To gain historical perspective on this geographic market reorientation, we 
must remember that much earlier, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
the northern textile industries had gained decisive dominance in most of  the 
Mediterranean markets for both cheap fabrics and luxury woollens, even if  
some of  the latter were re-finished there. But from the 1340s, the presence of  
northern-produced cheap says, other worsted and semi-worsted fabrics was 
almost non-existent in these southern markets, except for a few so-called 
‘Irish sayes’ of  doubtful provenance. Furthermore, by the later fourteenth 
century, the northern industries’ share of  Mediterranean markets for luxury-
woollens had shrunk considerably, in the face of  a growing preponderance 
from Tuscan, Lombard, and Catalan producers of  finer woollens, some of  
which, the Florentine in particular, were in fact far more luxurious and costly 
than even the very best Flemish and Brabantine woollens.44 
 
Textiles and Fairs: the Decline of  the Champagne and English Fairs 
The importance of  the Champagne and other international Fairs of  the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and of  their subsequent decline, as integral 
aspects of  these industrial-commercial transformations from the later thir-
teenth to fifteenth centuries, cannot be too strongly emphasized. The publica-
tions of  Patrick Chorley, if  not necessarily my own, have surely demonstrated 
beyond any doubt that the Champagne Fairs had owed their great and flour-
ishing expansion during the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries primarily to 
the sale or re-export of  northern textiles to the Mediterranean basin. Fur-
thermore, those textiles were not primarily high-quality woollens, as Pirenne, 
Bautier and so many others have wrongly asserted, but more especially, in 
terms of  both volume and value, the aforementioned cheaper, lighter fabrics: 
the semi- and full worsteds, coarse woollens, mixed fabrics, and linens. 
Equally evident is the fact that the decline of  these Fairs coincides exactly 
contemporaneously with the dramatic disappearance of  these cheap and light 
sayetteries and other draperies légères in the Low Countries and elsewhere in 
north-western Europe.45 
                                                     
44 J. MUNRO, Industrial Transformations, cit., pp. 110-48; ID., New Draperies, cit., pp. 35-127; ID., Symbiosis 
of  Towns and Textiles, cit., pp. 1-74. See also H. HOSHINO, M. MAZZAOUI, Ottoman Markets for Florentine 
Woolen Cloth in the Late Fifteenth Century, in “International Journal of  Turkish Studies”, 3, 1985-86, pp. 17-31; 
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45 See P. CHORLEY, Cloth Exports of  Flanders, cit., pp. 349-87; J. MUNRO, sources cited in nn. 42, 44. 
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Less well known is the indisputable fact the once famed medieval English 
fairs -- such as the St. Ives, St. Giles (Winchester), Stamford, and Northamp-
ton Fairs-- were also similarly undergoing a precipitous decline in commercial 
transactions from the 1290s, precisely when the once important English tex-
tile towns of  York, Louth, Beverley, Lincoln, Stamford, Northampton, 
Leicester, Huntingdon, Norwich, Colchester, Oxford, Winchester, and Lon-
don were all suffering from an equally dramatic slump in their export-
oriented production. As Chorley, Childs, and myself  have all contended, that 
cloth production had been predominantly in the form of  very cheap and light 
fabrics, which were also chiefly destined for Mediterranean markets, via the 
English and then the Champagne Fairs: e.g. serges, says, wadmal, the famed if  
ill-understood, mixed-fabric stamfords (stanfortes) and the even cheaper and 
lighter ‘Northamptons’.46 Indeed, Ellen Moore, the leading historian of  Eng-
lish medieval fairs, contends that the fortunes of  all these Fairs had been very 
closely to tied to the economies of  the eastern textile-manufacturing towns, 
and thus that such cloths had constituted the major part of  their commerce, 
especially in sales to visiting Flemish and Italian merchants.47 
 
Relative Transportation Costs by Maritime and Continental Routes in the Fourteenth 
Century 
The other and even more striking contemporaneous transformation, the 
aforementioned development of  the direct sea route from the Mediterranean 
to northwestern ports, must now, therefore, also be viewed not as a cause but 
instead as one of  the major consequences of  the Fairs’ decline. More pre-
                                                     
46 See P. CHORLEY, English Cloth Exports During the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries: the Continen-
tal Evidence, in “Historical Research: The Bulletin of  the Institute of  Historical Research”, 61, 144, 1988, 
pp. 1-10; W. CHILDS, Anglo-Castilian Trade in the Later Middle Ages, Manchester 1978, pp 73-5; ID., The English 
Export Trade in Cloth in the Fourteenth Century, in Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of  
Edward Miller , ed. R. BRITNELL, J. HATCHER, Cambridge/New York 1996, pp. 121-47; J. MUNRO, Industrial 
Crisis, cit., pp. 103-42. Thus at St. Ives, court incomes fell from £8 9s 2d in 1287 to £2 7s 6d in 1302. At 
Winchester’s St. Giles Fair, commercial revenues had dropped from £84 16s. 0d. in 1291 to £44 1s 0d in 
1314; as early as 1291 their formerly reliable earnings from Lincoln cloth merchants had ceased; and by 
1302 so had those from the York merchants. E.W. MOORE, The Fairs, cit., pp. 204-222. 
47 Ibid.. To be sure, Moore also adduces several other for this decline: including the dwindling atten-
dance of  Flemish merchants and the more aggressive role of  London’s commercial sector. But, While 
London had certainly succeeded in enlarging its commercial role in the English economy by the later thir-
teenth century, Pamela Nightingale has recently demonstrated that London was experiencing a severe 
commercial depression (with some depopulation) by the 1320s, one that probably had begun somewhat 
earlier. See P. NIGHTINGALE, The Growth of  London in the Medieval English Economy, in Progress and Problems in 
Medieval England: Essays in Honour of  Edward Miller, ed. R. BRITNELL, J. HATCHER, Cambridge 1996, pp. 89-
106. For example, London's share of  taxable national wealth fell from 3.5 percent in 1307 to 2.1 per cent 
in 1315, retaining that low figure in 1334 assessment; in her view, the recession lasted until the 1360s. See 
also J. MUNRO, Industrial Crisis, cit., pp. 103-41. 
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cisely they were the consequence of  those adverse war-related factors that so 
sharply raised the transport and transaction costs of  trading along the fre-
quently disrupted overland continental routes that had earlier fuelled the trade 
of  the Fairs. To cite just one example, in 1327, an Italian merchant com-
plained that the disruptions from the then raging Guelf-Ghibelline and 
Angevin wars had prevented his firm from transporting Franco-Flemish 
cloths from the Champagne Fairs to Genoa.48 Similarly, in 1342, a report 
commissioned by the government of  the nearby port of  Marseilles, so con-
cerned about the serious decline in its trade and population, clearly evident 
from c.1330, specifically laid the blame on the very same Angevin wars, and 
also on the ‘the Fall of  Acre’.49 
I am, of  course, not the first to observe the basic nature of  this early 
fourteenth-century shift from overland, continental trade routes, those based 
so much on the Champagne Fairs, to some increasing reliance on maritime 
routes to the North. Indeed, for the past thirty years much of  my research 
has been inspired by Herman Van der Wee’s seminal but sadly neglected An-
nales article of  1970, even if  I must now offer a minor criticism. For the Van 
der Wee article still leaves the reader with the impression that the establish-
ment of  the direct sea route was nevertheless a primary factor in the decline 
of  the Fairs. In this all too brief  article, he does, to be sure, focus on the con-
sequences of  warfare, but primarily the Hundred Years’ and related wars, in 
making the costs of  overland, continental trade so often prohibitive, except 
for very high-value items; and thus his article does not really consider the im-
pact of  the previous era of  warfare, that from the 1290s to the 1340s, which 
had been so crucial in determining the initial, if  partial, shift from the conti-
nental overland to maritime routes. At the same time, one must also admit 
that this shift was far from ever becoming a total one, that much overland 
trade still continued, and that the relative shares of  north-south commerce by 
                                                     
48 Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique, et l'Outremont, d'après les archives notariales génoises aux 
XIIIe et XIVe siècles, I-III, ed. R. DOEHAERD, Brussels 1941 (Institut Historique Belge de Rome: Études 
d'histoire économique et sociale), III, no. 1869, p. 1156: ‘Nec per terra ire potuit communiter propter guer-
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victoire de Charles d'Anjou à l'arrivée de Jeanne Ire, 1264 – 1348, Paris 1950, doc. no. 7, pp. 184-6: ‘quod deterio-
ratio et diminutio dictorum reddituum provenit propter diminucionem boni status civitatis Massilie, nam 
sicut civitas in personis et divitiis a tempore quo perdita fuit Acon et propter perdicionem ipsius et propter 
guerras quas habuerent ipsi Massilienses et sicut omnes redditus quos civitas ipsa habeat in communi et 
successive habuit domnus noster Rex et precessores sui diminuti sunt et reducti ad minorem quantitatem’. 
See also doc. no. 6, p. 184: letter of  Robert d'Anjou (King of  Naples), dated 21 Oct. 1331, concerning the 
serious depopulation of  Marseille; also E. BARATIER, F. REYNAUD, Histoire du commerce de Marseille, II, De 
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overland and maritime routes varied with the particular economic and politi-
cal circumstances of  the ensuing decades. 
However, even for the trade in high-valued items, such as luxury wool-
lens, two more statistical examples, from the 1390s, may be usefully cited. In 
1397, a member of  the Florentine Alberti firm contended that overland 
transport was feasible only for the very highest priced woollens.50 In 1398, the 
Italian merchant Gulgielmo Barberi, employed by the Datini firm of  Prato, 
reported that the cost of  shipping Wervik woollens from Bruges to Barcelona 
by sea amounted to 15 percent of  the price (22 florins), while shipping them 
overland, when routes were safer, cost 22 percent of  that price. But he also 
explicitly noted that some other merchants had ‘lost all their profit’ by so 
foolishly choosing to send their woollens overland. In contrast, we may note 
that, around 1310, the costs of  transporting far cheaper Caen sayes overland 
via the Champagne Fairs and the Rhone valley route to Florence had cost 
only 8.8 percent of  their much lower value (11.5 florins).51  
Even if  maritime trade did subsequently become relatively cheaper than 
overland continental trade, via the traditional routes, the reasons for those 
advantages did not lie in any supposed technological innovations. For most 
of  the supposed cost-savings advances, and especially those in naval technol-
ogy that finally produced the caravel-designs and the full-rigged carracks, 
came a full century after this shift to maritime trade.52 In any event, Russell 
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the Del Bene Company, in transporting northern textiles to Florence, ‘paid less per mile [or km] on the 
overland stretch from Paris to Marseilles than on the maritime stretch from Marseilles to Pisa.’ 
52 See R. UNGER, Dutch Ship Design in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, in “Viator”, 4, 1973, pp. 387-
412; ID., Dutch Shipbuilding Before 1800: Ships and Guilds,Van Gorcum 1978; ID., The Ship in the Medieval Econ-
omy, 600-1600, London/Montreal 1980; ID., Warships and Cargo Ships in Medieval Europe, in “Technology and 
Culture”, 22, April 1981, pp. 233-52; ID., Portuguese Shipbuilding and the Early Voyages to the Guinea Coast, in 
Vice-Almirante A. Teixeira Da Mota, In Memoriam, I, Lisbon 1987, pp. 229-249; C. CIPOLLA, Guns, Sails, and 
Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of  European Expansion 1400 – 1700, New York 1965; CH. 
BOXER, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415 – 1825, London 1969; M. ELBL, The Portuguese Caravel and Euro-
pean Shipbuilding: Phases of  Development and Diversity, in “Revista da Universidade de Coimbra”, 33, 1985, pp. 
43-72; ID., The Caravel and the Galleon, in Conway's History of  the Ship, III, Cogs, Caravels and Galleons, ed. R. 
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Menard has argued that, from the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, such 
changes in naval technology had little impact on direct shipping costs, whose 
changes were much more a function of  political and commercial develop-
ments, especially in terms of  providing relative security.53 Indeed on this very 
issue he also cited Postan’s comment: that ‘medieval communications, like 
other trading activities, suffered much more from instability and uncertainty, 
political in origin, than from high costs of  an inefficient transport service.’54 
Furthermore, the actual costs of  both shipbuilding itself  and of  maritime 
shipping rose in real terms, and quite substantially, principally again because 
of  more advanced forms of  naval warfare, partly in response to the piracy 
and corsair raids that so often accompanied such warfare. As Irene Katele has 
contended, the very commencement of  the fourteenth century witnessed a 
veritable ‘watershed in the history of  naval plundering.’55 In defence against 
such piracy and corsair warfare, Italians and Catalans built more heavily 
armed and thus much bigger, more sturdily designed ships, outfitted with lar-
ger complements of  cross-bowmen, all of  whom, along with regular sailors, 
were given steel-plated body armour. Costs mounted even more, from the 
1330s, with the introduction of  naval artillery and mobile small arms. Catalan 
shipping records show that freight rates indeed did rise substantially with 
such increased construction costs, at least for the heavily armed merchant 
ships: by over 25 percent between 1275 and 1330. Comparable Sicilian re-
cords reveal that freight rates virtually doubled over the fourteenth century.56 
To be sure, that remarkable Genoese innovation of  maritime insurance, from 
the early to mid fourteenth century, was designed to share the costs of  such 
risks; but rising insurance premiums still added to transaction costs. 
The Venetians, who curiously eschewed this financial innovation, instead 
chose, as their most cost-effective remedy, to design and build, with heavy 
                                                                                                                         
GARDINER, London 1994, pp. 91-98; A. LEWIS, T. RUNYAN, European Naval and Maritime History, 300 – 
1500, Bloomington 1985. 
53 R. MENARD, Transport Costs and Long-Range Trade, 1300 - 1800: Was There a European ‘Transport Revo-
lution’ in the Early Modern Era? in The Political Economy of  Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350 – 
1750, ed. J. TRACY, Cambridge 1991, pp. 228-275. For similar views published in the same year, see J. 
MUNRO, Industrial Transformations, cit., pp. 110-148.  
54 M. POSTAN, The Trade of  Medieval Europe, cit., pp. 203-204. 
55 I.B. KATELE, Piracy and the Venetian State: The Dilemma of  Maritime Defense in the Fourteenth Century, in 
“Speculum”, 63, 1988, pp. 865-889. See also B. KEDAR, Merchants in Crisis: Genoese and Venetian Men of  Af-
fairs and the Fourteenth-Century Depression, New Haven 1976, and nn. 53-54. 
56 CH.-E. DUFOURCQ, L'Espagne catalane, cit., pp. 534-542. Shipping costs ranged from £200 Barcelo-
nese for small ships (thirty-forty sailors) to £400 for galleys (eighty-120 rowers and 100-150 sailors); and 
costs of  arming such ships against corsairs ranged from £50 to £100 extra per month. For Sicily, see H. 
BRESC, Course et piraterie en Sicile (1250-1450), in “Anuario de estudios medievales”, 10, 1980, pp. 751-757; 
and ID., Un monde méditerranéen: Économie et société en Sicile, 1300 - 1450, I-II, Rome 1986, I, pp. 350-352. 
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state subsidies, even better galleys: the heavily-armed, three-masted so-called 
great-galley, a speedy military and commercial hybrid vessel that, as Lane has 
demonstrated, became the exclusive carrier of  precious cargoes.57 By the fif-
teenth century they were outfitted as well with three lateen sales and one 
enormous forward-facing bronze cannon. Nevertheless, even Venetian mer-
chants and their government would not risk sending their galleys to Alexan-
dria, Constantinople, Beirut, or the northern ports (Bruges, Southampton, 
London), when shipping lanes were menaced by naval war (e.g. during the 
Venetian-Genoese War of  1350-55), or by fleets of  corsairs. Thus, according 
to Venetian state records, the Flanders galleys made only 24 northbound voy-
ages from 1332, when state-subsidies commenced, to 1400 (i.e. a mean of  2.8 
per decade); but in the relatively more peaceful and commercially more propi-
tious fifteenth century they made 86 such northbound voyages. 58 Even then, 
sea transport was hardly cheap, for shipping a sack of  English Cotswold wool 
by galleys to Venice c. 1460 added about 25 percent to the cost.59 
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lian Maritime Trade, cit., pp. 321-326. 
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The Revival of  Overland Trade and International Fairs: the Epstein and Van der Wee 
Models 
By that time, however, and indeed perhaps even before the mid-fifteenth 
century, as Van der Wee has even more cogently demonstrated, the European 
economy was now undergoing yet another profound transformation in its in-
ternational trading patterns, with: (1) the commercial development of  chiefly 
new overland, continental routes; (2) a consequent relative shift away from the 
previously established maritime routes; and (3) a revival of  internationally-
oriented fairs. Indeed, the chief  and clearly fatal flaw about all the ‘progress-
oriented’ theories to explain the decline of  the earlier medieval international 
fairs, the Champagne Fairs in particular, was to ignore this very phenomenon 
of  the revived pre-eminence of  international fairs from the early to mid fif-
teenth century.60 Obviously they could not possibly have become outdated, 
and redundant; and obviously they still had much to offer in lowering or re-
ducing transaction costs for international trade, especially after such costs, in-
cluding transportation costs, had fallen, by the later fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, along the overland routes that serviced such international fairs.  
Furthermore, in another important, much more recent article, Stephan 
Epstein has demonstrated that the European economy of  the later Middle 
Ages (though clearly more so in the fifteenth than in the fourteenth century) 
had benefited from a profusion of  regional, chiefly land-based fairs that re-
duced transaction costs in such regional trade, an article in which he similarly 
ridiculed traditional arguments about the decline of  medieval fairs.61 While 
conceding the point that ‘why fairs should have been the preferred response 
to rising transactions costs ... is not in fact immediately clear’, he also cor-
rectly observes that the opposite is also true: that ‘the cost advantages of  
town markets over new fairs are hard to discern’. Indeed he then makes the 
very cogent points that capital investment and administrative costs for fairs, 
and living costs for visiting merchants there, were generally much lower than 
for permanent town markets, especially with smaller sizes. Even more impor-
tant were the ability of  fairs, and certainly the newer fairs, ‘to respond far 
more flexibly ... to changes in the character, patterns, and intensity of  trade’ 
than did most town markets, especially in so flexibly changing locations for 
                                                     
60 But cf. CH. VERLINDEN, Markets and Fairs, cit., p. 133: ‘Contrary to a commonly expressed opinion, 
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61 S.R. EPSTEIN, Regional Fairs, cit., pp. 459-482. 
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new commercial opportunities. One might also add to these arguments the 
point that such fairs tended to congregate a greater variety of  regional or in-
ternational merchants than did most towns, thus facilitating the dissemination 
of  market information. Finally, ‘the proof  of  the pudding is the fact that 
most of  the new fairs survived.’62  
In so far as Epstein is concerned with regional European fairs that did 
flourish before what Van der Wee discerned to be the true fifteenth-century 
revival of  international fairs, connected to the renewed growth continental 
long-distance trade, we may conclude that either: (1) the extent of  the late-
medieval decline in such overland trade and shift to maritime trade has been 
exaggerated; or (2) conversely, that, in terms of  the North-Thomas (1973) 
model and of  their own analyses of  the economic transformations in this era, 
disruptions of  traditional long-distance trade patterns and consequent rises in 
transaction costs not only reduced the scope of  such trade but necessarily 
made it all the more regional and localized.63 
Indeed the major components of  the earlier Van der Wee model, so 
closely corresponding to the North-Thomas model, must be reiterated here 
to elucidate the dynamics of  this revival of  overland continental trade. That 
revival had commenced from the early fifteenth century by following entirely 
new routes, those secure from the ravages of  the Hundred Years’ and other 
wars: from Italy, especially from Venice, across the eastern Alps (Brenner 
Pass, from Bolzano to Innsbruck), into Austria-South Germany, and from 
there via Frankfurt to the Rhine, leading down that river highway to the Low 
Countries, and in particular to the Brabant Fairs of  Antwerp and Bergen-op-
Zoom. As Van der Wee has argued, especially in his magnum opus The Growth 
of  the Antwerp Market and the European Economy, the Brabant Fairs owed their 
later fourteenth-century origins to a purely regional trade in foodstuffs and 
raw materials; but these commercial transformations converted them into 
truly international fairs. As the very mirror image of  the negative conse-
quence of  the earlier relative shift from continental to maritime routes, the re-
newed expansion in continental trade more than proportionately augmented 
demand for commercial services, manufactures, labour, raw materials and 
foodstuffs. It thereby increased aggregate incomes, and investments by a mul-
tiplier-accelerator effect: not just along these arterial routes, but via both in-
ternational and regional fairs, throughout an interlacing network of  regional 
                                                     
62 Ibid., pp. 470-471. 
63 D. NORTH, R. THOMAS, The Rise of  the Western World, cit., pp. 78-96: ‘The decline of  population, 
coupled with war, confiscation, pillage and revolution, reduced the volume of  trade and stimulated a trend 
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routes that serviced thousands of  towns and villages in a vast continental hin-
terland. While earlier the maritime ports had gained disproportionately from 
the relative shift to maritime routes, the relative shift back to overland conti-
nental trade now benefited a far greater number of  towns and villages, from 
very large to small.64 Nor should we just focus on the importance of  the Bra-
bant Fairs, even if  they were to make Antwerp the commercial and financial 
capital of  the early-modern European economy, in the full century from 
c.1460 to c.1568, i.e. to the commencement of  the Revolt of  the Low Coun-
tries against Spanish rule. For both the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries we 
must also consider the powerful stimulus from other international fairs, espe-
cially those in Frankfurt itself, above all, and then those in Lyons, Besançon, 
Geneva, Piacenza, Cremona, and Medina del Campo (Castile). 
 
Falling Overland Transport and Transaction Costs in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centu-
ries 
Furthermore, along these continental overland routes, transportation and 
transaction costs quite evidently did fall, from at least the mid-fifteenth cen-
tury, and relatively more so than on the maritime routes. If  the achievement 
of  relative peace and security along these aforementioned new routes was the 
primary factor, also important, when the transaction sector was so subject to 
scale economies, was the rapid demographic, urban, and commercial expan-
sion, especially in sixteenth-century Europe, and especially in the Mediterra-
nean basin, which offered much larger and more concentrated markets. 
Secondly, overland transport itself  benefited from several major innovations: 
the emergence of  specialized ‘commission’ houses, transport, and cartage 
firms; the new, larger-scale, lower-cost Hesse wagons (carts), in well organ-
ized convoys. These new transport firms offered merchants, both large and 
small, those selling in nearby or in distant overland markets, fully insured pas-
sage for their goods at predetermined, fixed rates; and they also provided an 
efficient overland postal service. Beginning with the arterial Italy-Antwerp 
routes, these new modes of  commercial transport soon spread to other over-
land routes servicing France, Germany, and Central Europe. 65 According to 
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both Van der Wee and Brulez, such improvements in overland transport 
made the overland continental routes both speedier and more reliable than 
Atlantic shipping routes from north-west Europe into the Mediterranean;66 
and proof  for that supposition may also be seen in the dramatic decline in 
Italian shipping to Antwerp, Bruges, and London, by the late fifteenth, early 
sixteenth century.67 Furthermore, even without these innovations, as any map 
will clearly reveal, the overland route from Antwerp to Venice had the enor-
mous advantage of  a far shorter distance: just 1300 km, less than 20 percent 
of  the distance by sea .68  
 
Textiles, Overland Trade, and the Brabant Fairs: the Revival of  the Sayetteries and Eng-
lish Cloths 
The final proof  for the economic superiority of  the overland routes in 
later fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe is their overwhelming dominance 
in the transport of  a renewed and greatly expanded trade in various cheap 
textiles from England and the Low Countries, via the Brabant Fairs, to the 
Mediterranean basin: not only in the steadily growing trade in South German 
fustians (see below, pp. 438-439), but also in cheap English woollen kerseys, and 
most especially in the says (sayes) and similar cheap, light serge-fabrics from 
the rapidly reviving and expanding Flemish sayetteries, and other draperies légères, 
once again led by Hondschoote. These says weighed only 40 percent as much 
as a Ghent dickedinnen broadcloth (260.4 g v. 633.8 g per m2,); and in 1540 an 
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67 The last Florentine galley arrived in 1478; and the Venetian galleys, after regular trips for most of  
the fifteenth century, failed to arrived in 1492, 1496-7, 1499, 1502, 1509-15, 1518, 1521-29, and 1531-32, 
making their final voyage in 1533. Tenenti-Vivanti, ‘Les galères marchandes vénitiennes,’ pp. 83-6, and pull-
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decline.’ See E. B. FRYDE, Italian Maritime Trade with Medieval England, cit., p. 331; ID., English Cloth Industry 
and the Trade with the Mediterranean, cit., p. 362; F. LANE, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders, cit., pp. 26-28. 
68 Cf. R. LOPEZ, Trade of  Medieval Europe: the South, cit., p. 354, noting that the Italians had had little 
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states seemed too modest to warrant the effort, while the Atlantic coast of  France and northern Europe 
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Antwerp master mason would have paid only 15.8 days’ wages to purchase a 
Hondschoote single say but 284.2 days’ wages for a Ghent dickeninnen.69 With-
out question the revival and dramatic expansion of  this textile industry, the 
most remarkable industrial transformation in the early-modern Low Coun-
tries, is closely linked to the expanding overland continental trade.70 Thus, on 
the very eve of  the 1568 Revolt of  the Netherlands, when aggregate exports, 
chiefly from the Brabant Fairs, had an estimated value of  about 16.0 million 
Carolus gulden (florins of  40d groot Flemish), aggregate say and serge exports 
accounted for about 2.5 million gulden (15.6 percent), while the domestic 
heavy-weight woollens now accounted for only 1.4 million gulden (8.8 per-
cent); but re-finished English cloths (including kerseys), valued at 3.12 million 
gulden, accounted for the lion’s share of  total textile exports (11.5 million gul-
den), and 19.5 percent of  total exports by value (Table 5).71 
Indeed, more than a century earlier, the English cloth trade had provided 
the first leg of  the tripod that supported the subsequent growth and ultimate 
hegemony of  the Brabant Fairs in European commerce and finance. In 1421, 
after encountering severe difficulties in their chief  overseas markets, espe-
cially in Prussia, those English merchants who had just organized the Mer-
chants Adventurer Company established a new overseas cloth staple at 
Antwerp, which eagerly welcomed this trade, since it no longer had a local 
woollens industry to protect. That very reason, a long-standing, rigorously 
enforced Flemish ban on all English woollens, rendered the much larger and 
more international emporium of  Bruges inaccessible, until well into the six-
teenth century. By the mid-century, English merchants had lost all their other 
Baltic and Scandinavian markets, and with final defeat in the Hundred Years’ 
War, those in Gascony as well, while the Italians still barred their access to 
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71 W. BRULEZ, Balance of  Trade of  the Netherlands, cit., pp. 22-45; J. DE VRIES, A. VAN DER WOUDE, 
The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of  the Dutch Economy, 1500 – 1815, Cambridge 1996, 
Table 9.1, p. 360. See the previous note. 
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Mediterranean markets. Thus they were forced, more and more, to funnel vir-
tually all of  their export trade, certainly in the form of  unfinished textiles, via 
London into the Brabant Fairs. Indeed merchants trading at these fairs com-
missioned dyers and shearers to ‘finish’ the English broadcloths that they had 
purchased for re-export to Germany, France, Central Europe, Italy, and else-
where.72  
That growing and finally overwhelming dependence of  England’s key ex-
port, woollen broadcloths and kerseys, on Antwerp and the Brabant Fairs is 
well reflected in the export statistics. In 1416-20, London’s share of  total 
English cloth exports was 41.7 percent (12,698 out of  27,977 cloths); in 
1466-70, when the English cloth trade began to recover from a quarter-
century slump, it was 55.5 percent; by 1486-90, it was 70.2 percent (35,122 
out of  50,005 cloths); and by 1546-50, for 91.6 percent (123,780 out 135,910 
cloths), when such textiles accounted for well over 90 percent of  all English 
exports by value.73.  
At the same, time, of  course, the Brabant Fairs also served as England’s 
chief  source of  European imports, via the agency of  the London Mercers’ 
Company (of  which the Merchants Adventurers had been an offshoot).74 
That new Antwerp-based European commercial structure also explains why 
there was no comparable revival of  England’s medieval fairs: simply because 
the Brabant Fairs now fully served that function for both the cloth export 
trade – as the Calais Staple had long done for the wool trade (1363-1558) – 
and also for the bulk of  its import trades. 
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The Catalyst: South German Fustians and the Silver-Copper Mining Boom, 1460- 1530 
Nevertheless, the initial and true catalyst for the revival and rapid expan-
sion of  the continental overland trade routes, the subsequent eighty-year 
boom in English cloth exports, and the real flourishing of  the Brabant Fairs 
was to be found instead in the economy of  South Germany, beginning with 
the development of  its fustian textile industry in the later fourteenth century. 
More than a century earlier, the opening of  the St. Gotthard Pass through the 
Swiss Alps (8° 31E, at the Schöllenen gorge, c.1220-38) and then more espe-
cially the development of  the aforementioned Brenner Pass (11° 32E) had 
opened up the South German and other Central European markets to the 
growing sales of  Italian fustians, a trade that was dominated more by German 
than Italian merchants and one that peaked in the early fourteenth century.75 
Thereafter the slow but irredeemable decline of  the Lombard fustian industry 
became all the more rapid from the 1370s, when warfare in both northern It-
aly and South Germany seriously disrupted the distribution of  its textiles, 
thereby encouraging the Swiss and South German towns, especially the 
Swabian – Constance, Basel, Ulm, Augsburg, Ravensberg, Memmingen, Bib-
erach, Nördlingen, and Regensberg – to transform their local linen crafts into 
very similar import-substitution industries using domestic flax and imported 
cotton. By the 1390s, that was chiefly Syrian cotton that the Germans pur-
chased at Venice, via the relatively secure Brenner Pass, with their silver from 
Central European mines.76 This rapidly expanding production of  fustians not 
                                                     
75 See nn. 34, 38 above. Cf. R. LOPEZ, Trade of  Medieval Europe, cit., pp. 374-75, 398-99, who contends 
that in the 11th century most of  the limited commercial traffic from Italy to northern Europe went by the 
Septimer and other central-western Alpine passes; but that during the 12th and early 13th centuries, most 
of  this traffic had been diverted to the Rhone Valley - Champagne Fairs route (via Genoa and Marseilles), 
which, though three times as long, was a much cheaper route. Even with competition from new routes via 
the St. Gotthard Pass, the Rhone-Champagne routes still remained much cheaper, especially with reduc-
tions in freight rates along them, routes ‘that exploited to the utmost the possibilities of  cheap transporta-
tion by water’ (p. 374). See also M. BOYER, Travel and Transport, Western European, in Dictionary of  the Middle 
Ages, ed. J.R. STRAYER, 12, New York 1989, pp. 148-162; A.C. LEIGHTON, Travel and Communications in 
Early Medieval Europe, AD 500-1100, London 1972; F. MELIS, I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel medioevo , Firenze 
1984. 
76 See M. MAZZAOUI, Italian Cotton Industry, cit., pp. 129-153; H. KELLENBENZ, The Fustian Industry of  
the Ulm Region in the Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries, in Cloth and Clothing in Medieval Europe: Essays in 
Memory of  Professor E.M. Carus-Wilson, ed. N.B. HARTE, K.G. PONTING, London 1983 (Pasold Studies in 
Textile History 2 1983), pp. 259-276; W. VON STROMER, Die Gründung der Baumwollindustrie im Mitteleuropa: 
Wirtschaftspolitik im Spätmittelalter, Stuttgart 1978; J. MUNRO, The Monetary Origins of  the ‘Price Revolution’ Before 
the Influx of  Spanish-American Treasure: The South German Silver-Copper Trades, Merchant-Banking, and Venetian 
Commerce, 1470-1540, in Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500 - 1808, ed. D. FLYNN, London, forthcom-
ing (Variorum Series: An Expanding World: The European Impact on World History, 1450 - 1800). Sales 
of  Ulm barchent have been recorded at Cologne as early as 1389; and at the Frankfurt Fair in 1398. The 
wars were those of  Visconti Milan vs. Florence and the Papal states (1370-75); Hungary and Padua vs. 
THE ‘NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS’ 439 
only provided South Germany with her major growth industry from this era 
but also represented the first successful expansion of  an internationally-
oriented export trade in cheap, light textiles in later medieval Europe. 
This export trade and the concomitant revival and expansion of  the over-
land continental trade routes from Venice to the Brabant Fairs, via the Frank-
furt Fairs, then received its most powerful stimulus from the South-German 
silver-copper mining boom, which commenced in the 1460s --at the very 
same time, therefore, as the onset of  the English cloth trade boom. Evidently 
responding, in the mid-century, to a severely deflationary scarcity of  silver, 
which had elevated the purchasing power of  that metal, the South Germans 
had effected a dual technological revolution, in both mechanical and chemical 
engineering, one that succeeded in boosting European output of  both metals 
over five-fold by the 1540s. Most of  those mines lay near or astride the major 
overland routes linking Italy with the Brabant Fairs. As the South Germans 
directed more and more of  those metals (and fustians) to Antwerp rather 
than to Venice, and as they established there major branches of  their mer-
chant banking houses, the Germans established the second leg of  the tripod 
of  Antwerp’s commercial greatness, while also more rapidly fostering the 
growth of  the now flourishing Frankfurt fairs along that same route. The 
chief  return commodities that the South Germans sought, in displacing the 
Rhenish merchants from that commerce, were these re-finished English tex-
tiles and the Low Countries’ own say and serge textiles. If  nothing succeeds 
so much as success, that burgeoning commerce also attracted the Portuguese, 
with their newly acquired trade in Asian spices. In establishing their spice sta-
ple at Antwerp, and thus the third leg of  its tripod, the Portuguese sought in 
particular the South German silver and copper, so necessary for purchasing 
those spices in the East Indies, and also the banking facilities of  the Fuggers, 
Welsers, and Hochstetters.77 
 
                                                                                                                         
Venice (1372-73); the Swabian League against Emperor Charles IV (1376-78); Florence vs. the Papacy 
(‘War of  Eight Saints’, 1376-78); Venice vs. Genoa (War of  Chioggia, 1378-80); Visconti Milan vs. Verona, 
Padua, Bologna, Venice, Florence, Piedmont (1384-92). 
77 J. NEF, Silver Production in Central Europe, 1450-1618, in “Journal of  Political Economy”, 49, 1941, 
pp. 575-591; H. VAN DER WEE, Antwerp Market, cit., II, 73-124; J. MUNRO, The Central European Mining 
Boom, Mint Outputs, and Prices in the Low Countries and England, 1450 - 1550, in Money, Coins, and Commerce: 
Essays in the Monetary History of  Asia and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern Times), Studies in Social and Economic 
History, ed. E.G. VAN CAUWENBERGHE, 2, Leuven 1991, pp. 119-183; J.A. VAN HOUTTE, La genèse du grand 
marché international d'Anvers à la fin du moyen âge, in “Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire”, 19, 1940, pp. 87-
126. 
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Fairs, the Law Merchant, and the Financial Revolution in Negotiable Bills and Rentes 
 Indeed all these new Fairs -- those of  Brabant, Frankfurt, Besançon, 
Geneva, and Lyons – were just as important in providing financial services; 
and in so doing these Fairs, beginning with those of  Brabant, introduced a 
truly momentous financial revolution for the early-modern economy, in terms 
of  both bills-of-exchange (and related) banking and in public finance. We are 
thus led back to North’s observations about the role of  the international ‘law 
merchant’ and to the concluding financial contributions that these early-
modern fairs provided in lowering the transaction costs of  international, now 
world-wide commerce. Contrary to De Roover’s misconceived assertions 
about bills of  exchange, alluded to earlier, such bills were not designed just 
and only for town-based ‘sedentary’ branch-plant town-based trade, but were 
also employed just as much in fairs, both regional and international.78 Nor did 
they supersede or displace the financial contract that was virtually identical to 
the old instrumentum ex causa cambii: the bill obligatory, so commonly used, 
along with bills of  exchange, at the Brabant Fairs, by English and other mer-
chants, into the seventeenth century.79 
Undoubtedly the most revolutionary development in the use of  such bills 
for financing international trade was the introduction of  full-fledged negotia-
bility, via law-merchant courts. This most complex topic is also one that both 
Herman Van der Wee and myself  have investigated at length, in other publi-
cations. My contribution was to demonstrate how the Mayor’s Court of  Lon-
don established, in 1436, the first legal precedent to ensure the full protection 
of  property rights and financial claims of  the ‘bearer’, as the third party to 
whom a bill of  exchange had been transferred.80 This was a Parliamentary 
Staple court that was authorized by several English statutes to utilize the still 
evolving international law-merchant, with the same judicial power as that en-
joyed by Common Law courts.81 What is indeed most striking about the deci-
                                                     
78 See above,  pp. 413-415 and n. 21.  
79 See See M. POSTAN, Credit in Medieval Trade, in “Economic History Review”, 1st. ser., 1, 1928, pp. 
234-261, reprinted in ID., Medieval Trade and Finance, Cambridge 1983, pp. 1-27; ID., Private Financial Instru-
ments in Medieval England, cit., pp. 28-64; and the following notes. 
80 J. MUNRO, The International Law Merchant, cit., pp. 49-80. 
81 See: Ordinance of  the Staples, 27 Edwardi III, stat.2, 1353, in Statutes of  the Realm, cit., I, pp. 332-
343. This statute formally established mercantile Staple Courts and commercial stapling obligations in fif-
teen English towns, and stipulated that ‘all Merchants coming to the Staple, their Servants and Meiny ... 
shall be ruled by the Law Merchant [lei merchant], of  all Things touching the Staple, and not by the Com-
mon Law of  the Land’ (cap. 8); and it also explicitly enjoined the King’s justices from interfering with any-
thing ‘which pertaineth to the Cognizance of  the Mayor and Ministers of  the Staple’ (cap. 5). The Staple 
courts were to consist of  the Staple or civic major ‘having Knowledge of  the Law-Merchant to govern the 
Staple, two constables and a jury composed of  domestic or foreign merchants, or both, depending upon 
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sion of  this London law-merchant court, known as Burton v Davy, is that it 
involved a true bill-of-exchange: one that an English merchant in Bruges 
(John Audley), as the resident factor for the London Merchant Elias Davy, 
having received funds as the taker from another English merchant in Bruges 
(Thomas Hanworth, as the deliverer), and resident agent for the Norwich mer-
chant John Burton, drew a bill upon his master Elias Davy (i.e. as the desig-
nated payer), in London, instructing him to pay ‘John Burton [the payee] or the 
bearer of  this letter of  payment’ the sum of  £30 sterling on the following 14 
March 1436.82 Subsequently, this bill was transferred to another merchant, 
John Walden, in payment for some other transaction; and when Davy refused 
to honour the ‘accepted’ bill that Walden presented, Walden then sued Elias 
Davy in this London court, necessarily having to secure the support of  John 
Burton, who then played no further role in the proceedings.83 The court, hav-
ing met on 10 August, 1 September, and again on 3 November, to hear wit-
nesses and establish the facts, ruled as early as 19 November, that ‘according 
to the Law Merchant and the custom aforesaid in such like cases,’ John Wal-
den had full and equal standing with Burton, and thus ordered Davy to pay 
Walden the £30 sterling in full, plus costs and 20s in damages.84 Significantly, 
as well, the London court pointedly stipulated that the parliamentary statutes 
on the law-merchant were designed to ensure speedy justice, sine dilatione; and 
that it would brook no further delays from Davy ‘because no discontinuance, 
according to the Law-Merchant and custom aforesaid, is permitted in any 
                                                                                                                         
the circumstances of  the case (cap. 8, 21); and they were given the power to seize the goods and chattels of  
defaulting debtors (cap. 9). 
82 Full text in Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, ed. H. HALL, 2, Central Courts, A.D. 1239 - 1633, 
London 1930 (Selden Society Publications, 46), III, pp. 117-119 (Latin and French, with English transla-
tions). Précis and incomplete, somewhat misleading analyses in F. BEUTEL, The Development of  Negotiable 
Instruments in Early English Law, in “Harvard Law Review”, 51, 1938, pp. 830-831, and J. HOLDEN, The His-
tory of  Negotiable Instruments in English Law, London 1955, pp. 23-24. The entire document is in the form of  
a reply by the London Mayor, John Mitchell, to a Chancery writ of  Henry VI, dated 14 February 15 Hen. 
VI, or 1437, the year erroneously given by Beutel, Holden, and many others for the London case itself. See 
also a contrary and in my view incorrect interpretation in J.S. ROGERS, The Early History of  the Law of  Bills 
and Notes: A Study of  the Origins of  Anglo-American Commercial Law, Cambridge 1995 (Cambridge Studies in 
English Legal History), pp. 24-25, 45-51, 174. 
83 H. HALL, Law Merchant, cit., pp. 117-18. On 10 August 1436, after several further rebuffs, Walden 
presented this dishonoured bill to the London Mayor’s court, along with ‘a bill or supplication made in the 
name of  the aforementioned John Burton, according to the Law Merchant and custom of  the city of  
London’. 
84 Ibid., p. 117: ‘To my very honoured master, Elias Davy, mercer, at London, let this be given. Very 
honoured sir, please it you to know that I have received here [in Bruges] of  John Burton [by the hands of  
Thomas Hanworth] by exchange, 30 l. [sterling] payable at London to the aforesaid John [Burton] or to the 
bearer of  this letter of  payment on the 14th day of  March next coming, by this my first and second letter 
of  payment. And I pray you that it may be well paid at the day. Written at Bruges, the 10th day of  Decem-
ber [1435], by your attorney, John Audeley, etc.’ 
JOHN H. MUNRO 
 
442 
mercantile causes of  a court of  this nature’. The judge (John Mitchell) also 
rebuffed Davy’s demand to have the case heard in the Common Law court of  
King’ Bench, asserting that his court had sole jurisdiction, ‘according to the 
Law-Merchant ... and by divers statutes and Parliaments’ to hear this case.85 If  
‘time is money’, then obviously the major savings in transaction costs was 
such speedy justice, compared to the often drawn out proceedings of  Com-
mon Law courts, which, in any event, would never have given any standing to 
holograph documents, such as this bill of  exchange, nor any weight to cur-
rent mercantile practices as those established in fair-oriented law-merchant 
courts. 
As Herman Van der Wee has also demonstrated, a similar law-merchant 
court in Antwerp issued, in 1507, an almost equivalent turba or verdict involv-
ing, this time, an English letter obligatory whose payment was due to an Eng-
lish cloth merchant trading at the Brabant Fairs.86 Subsequently, in 1527, 
another law-merchant court, in Bruges, similarly declared that ‘the bearer had 
all the rights of  a principal’ in claiming payment on a commercial bill and in 
suing defaulting debtors.87 These in turn provided the necessary precedents to 
permit the Estates General of  the Habsburg Netherlands to complete the 
necessary legal foundations for fully-fledged negotiability, in ordinances of  
March 1537 and October 1541, the first such national legislation in early-
                                                     
85 Ibid., pp. 118-19. The text in translation: ‘According to the Law-Merchant and the ancient liberties 
and free customs of  the city itself, as by divers statutes and Parliaments...the mayor, etc. have the power 
and use of  hearing and considering causes and actions of  all and singular merchants, as to all manner of  
loans, barratries [vexatious litigations], exchanges and letters of  payment and other things, and mercantile 
contracts made or entered into between merchants themselves or their factors making plaints at whatso-
ever ordinary fairs ... or merchant towns outside the realm of  England... and of  trying those causes and 
actions by juries of  merchants passing between a foreign place’. Cf. Calendar of  Letter-Books Preserved among 
the Archives of  the Corporation of  the City of  London at the Guildhall: Letter Book K. Temp. Henry VI, ed. R. 
SHARPE, London 1911, pp. 208-209: ‘by the Law-Merchant and the ancient liberties and customs of  the 
City the Mayor and Aldermen, from time immemorial, had exercised jurisdiction over mercantile disputes 
arising between merchants of  the City; and that Elias Davy, mentioned in the writ, was for many years and 
is a merchant and citizen of  London, and was warned by order of  Henry Frowyk, the Mayor, and the Al-
dermen to appear before them in the Chamber of  the Guildhall...’ 
86 H. VAN DER WEE, Anvers et les innovations de la technique financière aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles, in “An-
nales: E.S.C.”, 22, 1967, pp. 1067-1089; republished as Antwerp and the New Financial Methods of  the 16th and 
17th Centuries, in H. VAN DER WEE, The Low Countries in the Early Modern World, Cambridge 1993, pp. 145-
166; ID., Growth of  the Antwerp Market, cit., II, pp. 333-368 ; ID., Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, in Cam-
bridge Economic History of  Europe, V, The Economic Organization of  Early Modern Europe, ed. E.E. RICH, CH. 
WILSON, Cambridge 1977, pp. 310-335. 
87 A.P. USHER, The Early History of  Deposit Banking in the Mediterranean, I, Structure and Functions of  the 
Early Credit System: and Banking in Catalonia, 1240-1723, Cambridge Mass. 1943, pp. 98-9, citing a document 
in Coutume de la ville de Bruges, ed. L. GILLIODTS-VAN SEVEREN, Brussels 1875 (Commission Royale d'His-
toire), II, no. 127, p. 318. See also R. DE ROOVER, Gresham on Foreign Exchange: An Essay on Early English 
Mercantilism, Cambridge Mass. 1949, pp. 117-152, citing the text of  the ordinance of  the 1537 Estates Gen-
eral discussed in the following note. 
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modern Europe. Together, they permitted the bearer of  any bill to sue any 
and all prior assignors of  the note for the full payment, and provided other 
legal guarantees of  the property rights of  bearers. Furthermore, and rather 
astoundingly for a still Catholic legislature, these ordinances also permitted 
interest payments up to 12 percent per annum on all debts and commercial 
bills.88 Full and true negotiability, of  course, depends upon the ability of  third 
parties to engage in discounting – i.e. to sell a bill before maturity for less 
than its stipulated face value, i.e. by the amount of  forgone interest; and that 
was possible only if  merchants were not subjected to threats of  prosecution 
for violating the usury laws (which thus now applied only to interest rates 
above 12 per cent). 
 
European Public Finance and the Fairs in Sixteenth-Century Europe 
As important as the principle of  negotiability was for the world of  private 
mercantile finance and international trade, equally significant was its immedi-
ate extension to the realm of  government finance: in permitting, with far 
lower transaction costs, the transferability of  government rentes, i.e. annuities, 
as the now almost universal form of  public debt, to third parties. Because 
rentes (renten) were permanent and non-redeemable, except when the issuing 
government arbitrarily chose to repurchase them, they were not true loans 
(i.e. mutuum), and thus they escaped any taint of  usury, especially after receiv-
ing sanction from the papal bulls of  1425 and 1455. Yet obviously more in-
vestors would be willing to purchase rentes if  they had both the legal right and 
the ability to sell their rentes, i.e. their claims to annuity payments, and thus to 
recoup their principal (with capital gains or losses), and to do so in an effi-
cient, low-cost secondary market. Such a financial market, and one clearly as-
sociated as an integral part of  the Brabant Fairs, was provided by the 
founding of  the Antwerp Bourse (Beurs) in 1531. The very major role that 
                                                     
88 H. VAN DER WEE, Credit and Banking Systems, cit., p. 326: ‘...in this way, the various transferring 
creditors remained jointly responsible for payment’. For the text of  the March 1537 ordinance, concerning 
bills of  obligatory only, see Recueil des ordonnances des Pays Bas, deuxième série, 1506 - 1700, ed. C. LAURENT, M. 
J. LAMEERE, H. SIMONT, Brussels 1907 (Commission Royale d'Histoire), IV, pp. 15-17, and 34-35. For the 
text of  the 31 October 1541 decree (including bills of  exchange), see H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Ant-
werp Market, cit., II, p. 344: ‘Ordonnons que doresenavant tous ceulx qui aueront accepté ... quelque lettre 
de change seront tenus de payer la somme contenue en ycelle en deniers évaluez ... sans que pour lesdits 
changes ou aultres obligations contractez entre marchans on puist donner en payement aultres obligations 
par forme d'assignacions, lesquelles le créditeur ne sera tenu daccepter sil ne veult, et en acceptant lassigna-
cion demeurerea neantmoins le premier debteur obligé tant que le marchant sera réalement payé ou effec-
tuellement contente de son due’. See also R. USHER, Deposit Banking, cit., pp. 98-99; and R. DE ROOVER, 
Gresham, cit., pp. 117-152, who noted that the 1537 ordinance applied only to letters obligatory and not to 
bills of  exchange, which ‘rarely if  ever have bearer clauses in them’ (evidently unaware of  the English ex-
amples). 
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such sixteenth-century fairs as those of  Geneva, Besançon, Piacenza, and es-
pecially Castile (Medina del Campo) and Lyons, played in European public 
finance is too well known to require further elaboration here.89 The interna-
tional fairs of  early-modern Europe were thus arguably far more important in 
lowering the transaction costs of  international trade, international finance, 
and government finance than they had been in their supposed heyday of  the 
thirteenth century. Indeed, as the most striking evidence for such a decline in 
transaction costs in early-modern Europe, or reflection thereof, is the fall in 
nominal and real interest rates, by one half, from the 1440s to the mid 1550s, 
despite rational expectations of  rising interest rates during the inflation that 
commenced c. 1515-20, marking the onset of  famous Price Revolution era.90 
                                                     
89 See in particular H. VAN DER WEE, Monetary, Credit, and Banking Systems, cit., pp. 315-335. 
90 ID., Antwerp Market, cit., I, Appendix 45: Financial Statistics, pp. 525-528; and II, 325-364: from 20-
25 percent in 1450 to 9-10 percent in 1550; J. MUNRO, Precious Metals and the Origins of  the Price Revolution 
Reconsidered: The Conjuncture of  Monetary and Real Forces in the European Inflation of  the Early to Mid-Sixteenth 
Century, in Monetary History in Global Perspective, 1500 - 1808, Proceedings of  the 12th International Economic His-
tory Congress, ed. C.E. NÚÑEZ, Seville 1998, pp. 35-50. 
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APPENDIX: Burton v Davy, 1436 and Negotiable ‘Bearer’ Bills of  Exchange 
The bill of  exchange drawn in Bruges upon a London merchant:  
A mon treshonure mestre Elys Davy, mercer, a Loundres, soit doné: 
Treshonure sire vous please assavoir que jay resceu yci de John Burton [per ma-
nus Thome Hanworth mercatoris, tunc factoris sui] par eschange xxx l. [sterling], 
appaiers a Loundres al avauntdit John ou al portour diceste lettre de paiement le 
xiiii jours de March’ proch[ein] a venir, par cest ma premier et seconde lettre de 
paiement. Et je vous emprie quil soit bien paie a le jour. 
Escript a Bruges le x jour de Decembre [1435], par vostre attourne, 
John Audeley, etc. 
Principals and Agents: 
1. The Deliverer in Bruges: Thomas Hanworth, factor of  John Burton, mer-
chant of  Norwich 
2. The Taker in Bruges: John Audeley, factor of  Elias Davy, London mercer, 
who receives the equivalent, in Flemish funds (amount not specified), of  
£30 sterling, and who then [10 December 1435] draws a bill on his master 
Elias Davy for payment on 14 March 1436. 
3. The Payer in London: Elias Davy, London mercer, who has evidently ac-
cepted the bill for payment and then ‘dishonoured’ the bill: i.e. refused to 
pay the bearer on the redemption date. 
4. The Payee in London: John Burton, or  
5. The ‘bearer of  this letter’: [portour diceste lettre de paiement] John Walden, 
who launched the suit in the London Mayor’s court, with support from the 
payee, John Burton 
Ruling of  the London Mayor’s Court of  29 November 1436: 
Et super hoc quia tam per sacramentum dicti Thome Hanworth qui deliberavit, 
quam sacramentum precdicti Johannis Audeley, qui recepit denarios predictos per 
escambium in forma predicta ..; ideo consideratum est per eandem curiam mercato-
rium juxta legem mercatoriam et consuetudinem predictam in hujusmodi casibus, 
etc. usitatas et approbatus, quod ilem Elias [Davy] juxta vim, formam, et effectum 
dicte litere solvat easdem xxx l. prefato supplicanti vel Johanni Walden portitori ejus-
dem litere, qui loco suo tenetur et habetur in hoc casu, etc., juxta legem mercatoriam 
et consuetudinem antedictam, etc., et xx s. ultra pro dampnis in hac parte et sustenta-
tis, etc. 
 
Source: Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant, II, Central Courts, Supplementary, A.D. 1251-1779, ed. H. 
HALL, London 1932 (Selden Society Publications, XLIX), no. 38, pp. 117-119. 
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Table 1. Exports of  English Broadcloths, 1347/48 to 1548/49  
English Broadcloth = 24 yds by 1.75 yds, for cloths of  assise: 4 straits and dozens = 1 broadcloth; and 3 
kerseys = 1 broadcloth. 
From one sack of  wool, 4.333 broadcloths could be manufactured 
Year 
Michaelmas 
Denizen 
Exports 
Hansard 
Exports 
Other Aliens 
Exports 
TOTAL 
EXPORTS 
London 
Total 
London as 
% of  Total 
1348-50 2,246  310,000 2,556   
1351-55 1,586  335,000 1,921   
1356-60 7,376 174,000 1,511 9,061   
1361-65 9,099 1,020 1,598 11,717   
1366-70 10,978 1,310 2,240 14,527   
1371-75 9,102 1,240 1,869 12,211   
1376-80 9,673 1,383 2,586 13,643   
1381-85 13,949 2,800 5,493 22,242   
1386-90 17,192 3,125 5,293 25,610   
1391-95 22,974 6,346 10,205 39,525   
1396-00 23,318 5,646 9,811 38,775   
1401-05 19,450 6,548 8,571 34,570   
1406-10 12,997 6,568 12,181 31,746 14,251 44.89% 
1411-15 12,284 4,980 9,919 27,183 14,493 53.31% 
1416-20 14,051 5,722 8,205 27,977 12,698 45.39% 
1421-25 21,180 6,935 12,160 40,275 16,812 41.74% 
1426-30 20,334 5,304 14,768 40,406 17,498 43.30% 
1431-35 25,474 4,062 10,492 40,027 17,069 42.64% 
1441-45 28,163 11,336 16,957 56,456 23,938 42.40% 
1446-50 25,286 9,301 11,259 45,847 14,229 31.04% 
1451-55 0,785 8,214 7,701 36,700 16,419 44.74% 
1456-60 18,911 10,017 7,562 36,489 16,162 44.29% 
1460-65 16,046 8,584 4,371 29,002 16,041 55.31% 
1466-70 21,255 5,807 10,386 37,447 20,788 55.51% 
1471-75 20,705 3,415 12,417 36,537 23,328 63.85% 
1476-80 32,185 8,226 10,030 50,441 34,444 68.29% 
1481-85 29,191 13,439 11,568 54,198 36,293 66.96% 
1486-90 25,892 13,740 10,373 50,005 35,122 70.24% 
1491-95 29,513 15,100 12,332 56,945 35,893 63.03% 
1496-00 35,668 17,175 9,740 62,583 42,746 68.30% 
1501-05 44,803 17,638 14,830 77,271 46,611 60.32% 
1506-10 46,832 16,984 20,987 84,803 52,390 61.78% 
1511-15 49,110 21,621 15,861 86,592 62,257 71.90% 
1516-20 51,128 20,411 18,559 90,099 63,084 70.02% 
1521-25 48,675 18,457 15,137 82,269 61,854 75.19% 
1526-30 56,942 20,402 16,190 93,534 72,350 77.35% 
1531-35 53,966 24,274 15,847 94,087 75,503 80.25% 
1536-40 61,008 30,747 17,523 109,278 91,731 83.94% 
1541-45    118,056 101,550 86.02% 
1546-50    135,190 123,780 91.56% 
1551-55    126,595 110,888 87.59% 
Sources: England’s Export Trade, 1275-1547, ed. EM. CARUS WILSON, O. COLEMAN, Oxford 1963, pp. 36-
119; A.R. BRIDBURY, Medieval English Clothmaking: An Economic Survey, London 1982, Appendix F, pp. 18-22. 
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Table 2.  Production and Export of  Says from the Hondschoote Sayetterie in 
quinquennials means, 1401-05 to 1596-1600 
Year 
Hondschoote 
Drapery Tax Farm in £ parisis 
240d per £ parisis 
Cloths 
Represented by tax farm 
8d. per cloth 
Hondschoote 
Cloth Sales: Exports 
in Single Says* 
1401-05 54.80 1,644  
1406-10 78.00 2,340  
1411-15 85.60 2,568  
1416-20 117.60 3,528  
1421-25 152.80 4,584  
1426-30 165.80 4,974  
1431-35 172.00 5,160  
1436-40 176.00 5,280  
1441-45 180.00 5,400  
1446-50 278.00 8,340  
1451-55 345.60 10,368  
1456-60 388.00 11,640  
1461-65 404.00 12,120  
1466-70 435.20 13,056  
1471-75 464.00 13,920  
1476-80 424.00 12,720  
1481-85 455.00 13,650  
1486-90 488.70 14,661  
1491-95 399.95 11,999  
1496-1500 424.00 12,720  
1501-05 588.00 17,640  
1506-10 667.20 20,016  
1511-15 757.60 22,728  
1516-20 980.00 29,400  
1521-25 1,071.60 32,148  
1526-30 1,163.20 34,896 31,583.44 
1531-35 1,452.80 43,584 41,184.50 
1536-40 1,439.20 43,176 42,761.40 
1541-45 1,580.80 47,424 44,547.60 
1546-50 1,634.80 49,044 45,453.40 
1551-55 2,228.80 66,864 57,387.40 
1556-60 2,472.40 74,172 67,026.20 
1561-65 2,946.40 88,392 89,699.60 
1566-70 2,987.20 89,616 93,057.20 
1571-75 2,716.00 81,480 82,772.40 
1576-80 2,224.00 66,720 81,550.50 
1581-85 384.00 11,520 16,961.20 
1586-90 494.00 14,820 12,127.80 
1591-95 724.00 21,720 20,039.70 
 
* A fine narrow say measured 28.0 m (40 ells) by 0.7 m (1 ell), with a finished area of  19.60 m2, and with a 
weight of  260.4 grams per sq. metre; a small double say measured 25.725 m (36.75 ells) by 0.875 m (1.25 
ells), with a finished area of  22.509 m2, and with a weight of  322.4 grams per sq. metre. In the 1540s, at 
JOHN H. MUNRO 
 
448 
the Antwerp market, Hondschoote single says sold for £0.783 to £0.967 groot Flemish (15s 8d. to 19s 4d. 
groot Flemish), which represented, in value, 13.42 days’ wages to 18.32 days wages for an Antwerp master 
mason, then earning 12.67d (1540-42) to 14.00d. groot per day (from 1543).  
 
Source: E. COORNAERT, La draperie-sayetterie d'Hondschoote, XIVe-XVIIIe siècles, Paris 1930; calculated from 
Appendix IV, 485-90 (data extracted from: ARCHIVES DÉPARTEMENTALES DU NORD, Section B. État gé-
néral, 4068-4236, 17600); Appendix V, 493-95 (data extracted from STADSARCHIEF HONDSCHOOTE, Series 
GG 53, 54, 70, 38, 398, 82; CC 89, 40-50, 61-82; and HH 12-13). Note: double says are counted as two 
single says; J. MUNRO, Textiles as Articles of  Consumption in Flemish Towns, 1330 - 1575, in “Bijdragen tot de 
geschiedenis”, 81/1-3, 1998, pp. 275-288. 
 
Table 3. Prices of  Flemish and Brabantine Says, Other Light Cloths, and 
Heavy-Weight Woollens: as Sold in Florence by the Del Bene Company, 
1318-23  
in Soldi Affiorini of  Florence, and in Flemish Shillings Groot 
Per Canna of  Florence (= 3.5 Flemish ells) 
Textile 
Town 
Maximum 
soldi 
affiorini 
Median 
soldi 
affiorini 
Maximum 
Flemish 
shillings 
Median 
Flemish 
shillings 
 
Maximum 
% of  Douai 
Maximum 
Median as 
% of  Ypres 
Median 
Says and Other Draps Légers 
Hondschoote 63 52 2.333 1.917  32.81% 41.60% 
Arras 50 50 1.833 1.833  26.04% 40.00% 
Poperinge 47 43 1.750 1.583  24.48% 34.40% 
Ghistelles 24 23 0.917 0.833  12.50% 18.40% 
Heavy-Weight Woollens 
Douai 192 177 7.167 6.583  100.00% 141.60% 
Brussels 185 154 6.917 5.750  96.35% 123.20% 
Mechelen 158 155 5.917 5.750  82.29% 124.00% 
Ghent 155 131 5.750 4.917  80.73% 104.80% 
Ypres 143 125 5.333 4.667  74.48% 100.00% 
 
Notes : 
1 gold florin of  Florence = 29 soldi 
affiorini; 1 florin = 13d groot Flemish 
1 canna of  Florenze= 4 braccia = 2.452 metres = 3.5 Flemish ells 
Sources: H. HOSHINO, The Rise of  the Florentine Woollen Industry in the Fourteenth Century, in Cloth and Clothing 
in Medieval Europe, ed. N.B. HARTE, K. G. PONTING, London 1983, calculated from Table 11.2, p. 190; P. 
SPUFFORD, Handbook of  Medieval Exchange, London 1986, tables on pp. 34, 186, 215. 
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Table 4. Prices of  Ghent Dickedinnen Woollens, Mechelen Rooslaken Wool-
lens, and Hondschoote Says, and the Daily Wages for an Antwerp Mason, 1535 
– 1545 (in pence and pounds groot Flemish) 
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1535 14.150 10.667   328.660  10.333 2.637  68.730 
1536 14.250 10.667   310.910  11.000 11.497  297.470 
1537 14.500 11.333   298.280  11.667 13.683  254.330 
1538 14.500 11.333 0.967 2.278 274.730 18.320 12.667 11.775 0.785 295.530 
1539 15.000 11.333 0.945 2.184 284.200 17.900 12.667 11.984 0.755 300.400 
1540 15.000 11.333 0.835 1.961 284.200 15.820 12.667 12.365 0.688 291.130 
1541 15.500 11.333 0.879 2.015 293.680 16.650 12.667 13.381 0.759 278.000 
1542 14.500 11.333 0.838 2.005 274.730 15.880 12.667 11.853 0.685 293.600 
1543 14.000 11.333 0.783 1.775 240.000 13.420 14.000 10.364 0.580 324.200 
1544 14.000 11.333 0.908 1.942 240.000 15.570 14.000 9.571 0.621 351.070 
 
Sources: STADSARCHIEF GENT, Stadsrekeningen 1534/5-1544/5, Reeks 400: nos.46-52; STADSARCHIEF 
ECHELEN, Stadsrekeningen 1534/5-1544/5, nos.209-19; H. VAN DER WEE, Growth of  the Antwerp Markt and 
the European Economy, 14th to 16th Centuries, I-III, The Hague 1963, 1, pp. 457-468 (Appendix 39); sources 
cited in Tables 1 and 2.  
 
Notes: 
a. Converted from Brabant groten: 1.5d Brabant groot = 1.0d Flemish groot (gros) 
b. Ghent woollens (dickedinnen): 30 ells by 9.5 quarter ells, made from English March (Shrop-
shire and Herefordshire) and Cotswolds wools. 
c. Mechelen woollens (Rooslaken): 30 ells by 10 quarter ells (March wools), prices converted from 
pond groot Brabant into pond groot Flemish 
d. Hondschoote single says: 18 ells by 5 quarter ells: Hondschoote price. 
e. Hondschoote double says: 36.75 ells by 5 quarter ells: Antwerp price. 
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